text stringlengths 51 4.95k | embedding listlengths 1.54k 1.54k | example_idx int64 0 2.23k |
|---|---|---|
According to Zero Trust Architecture:
| | | 3.2.2. | [
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According to IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline:
| 1. The ability to use demonstrably secure cryptographic modules for standardized cryptographic algorithms (e.g., encryption with authentication, cryptographic hashes, digital signature validation) to prevent the confidentiality and integrity of the device's stored and transmitted data from being compromised 2. The ability for authorized entities to render all data on the device inaccessible by all entities, whether previously authorized or not (e.g., through a wipe of internal storage, destruction of cryptographic keys for encrypted data) 3. Configuration settings for use with the Device Configuration capability including, but not limited to, the ability for authorized entities to configure the cryptography use itself, such as choosing a key length | • This capability supports access management, data protection, and incident detection. • Authorized entities (e.g, customers, administrators, users) often want the confidentiality of their data protected so unauthorized entities cannot access their data and misuse it. • Authorized entities often want the integrity of their data protected so it is not inadvertently or intentionally changed, which could have a variety of adverse consequences (e.g., issuing the wrong command to a piece of equipment, concealing malicious activity). | • AGELIGHT : 5, 7, 18, 24, 25, 34 • BITAG : 7.2, 7.10 • CSDE : 5.1.3, 5.1.4, 5.1.5, 5.1.8, 5.1.10 • CTIA : 4.8, 5.14, 5.15 • ENISA : GP-OP-04, GP-TM- 02, GP-TM-04, GP-TM-14, GP-TM-24, GP-TM-32, GP- TM-34, GP-TM-35, GP-TM- 39, GP-TM-40 • ETSI : 4.4-1, 4.5-1, 4.5-2, 4.11-1, 4.11-2, 4.11-3 • GSMA: CLP13_6.4.1.1, 6.11, 6.12.1.1, 6.19, 7.6.1, 8.10.1.1, 8.11.1 • IEC : CR 3.1, CR 3.4, CR 4.1, CR 4.2, CR 4.3 • IIC : 7.3, 7.4, 7.6, 7.7, 8.8, 8.11, 8.13, 9.1, 10.4, 11.9 • IoTSF : 2.4.6.5, 2.4.7, 2.4.8.8, 2.4.8.16, 2.4.9, 2.4.12.2, 2.4.16.1, 2.4.16.2 • ISOC/OTA : 2, 17, 33 • OCF: 8.2, 11.2.1, 11.3, 14.2.2 • PSA: C1.1, C1.4, C2.4, D5.2, R2.2, R2.3, R6.1, R7.1 | | [
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0.03981962... | 1 |
According to Multi-Factor Authentication for Criminal Justice Information Systems_ Implementation Considerations for Protecting Criminal Justice Information:
3.2.3. 3.2.3. | [
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According to Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information_ A Supplement to NIST Special Publication 800-171:
............................................ 5 |
| 2.1 DEVELOPMENTAPPROACH ......................................................................................................
| 5 |
| 2.2 ORGANIZATIONANDSTRUCTURE | ............................................................................................. 7 |
| 2.3 FLEXIBLE APPLICATION | ............................................................................................................. 9 |
| CHAPTER THREE THE REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 11 | CHAPTER THREE THE REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 11 |
| 3.1 ACCESSCONTROL | .................................................................................................................. 12 |
| 3.2 AWARENESSANDTRAINING | ................................................................................................... | [
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A111D3 DflTSbb
NATL INST OF STANDARDS & TfCH R.I.C. A1 11 03089566
NBS Invitational Wor/Aud^ and evaluatio
QC100 .U57 NO.500-19, 1977 C.2 NBS-PUB-O
IMCE & TECHNOLOGY:
UDIT AND EVALUATION
OF COMPUTER SECURITY
iO-19
NBS Special Publication 500-19
U.S. DEPARTMEMT OF COMMERCE
National Bureau of Standards
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
The National Bureau of Standards^ was established by an act of Congress March 3, 1901. The Bureau's overall goal is to
strengthen and advance the Nation's science and technology and facilitate their effective application for public benefit. To this
end, the Bureau conducts research and provides: (1) a basis for the Nation's physical measurement system, (2) scientific and
technological services for industry and government, (3) a technical basis for equity in trade, and (4) technical services to pro-
mote public safety. The Bureau consists of the Institute for Basic Standards, the Institute for Materials Research, the Institute
for Applied Technology, the Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, the Office for Information Programs, and the
Office of Experimental Technology Incentives Program. THE INSTITUTE FOR BASIC STANDARDS provides the central basis within the United States of a complete and consist-
ent system of physical measurement; coordinates that system with measurement systems of other nations; and furnishes essen-
tial services leading to accurate and uniform physical measurements throughout the Nation's scientific community, industry,
and commerce. The Institute consists of the Office of Measurement Services, and the following center and divisions:
Applied Mathematics — Electricity — Mechanics — Heat — Optical Physics — Center for Radiation Research — Lab-
oratory Astrophysics- — Cryogenics^ — Electromagnetics — Time and Frequency'. | [
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0.0290132... | 4 |
According to Ordered t-way Combinations for Testing State-based Systems:
rd with combinatorial interaction testing. Computer. 2013 Dec 11;47(2):37-45. - [30] Garn B, Simos DE, Zauner S, Kuhn R, Kacker R. Browser fingerprinting using combinatorial sequence testing.
In Proceedings of the 6th Annual Symposium on Hot Topics in the Science of Security 2019 Apr 1 (pp. 1-9). - [31] Ozcan M. An Industrial Study on Applications of Combinatorial Testing in Modern Web Development. In2019 IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation Workshops (ICSTW) 2019 Apr 22 (pp. 210-213). - [32] Ratliff, Z. B. (2018). Black-box Testing Mobile Applications Using Sequence Covering Arrays. undergraduate thesis, Texas A&M University. - [33] Ratliff ZB, Kuhn DR, Ragsdale DJ. Detecting Vulnerabilities in Android Applications using Event Sequences. In2019 IEEE 19th International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security (QRS) 2019 Jul 22 (pp. 159-166). IEEE. - [34] Elks DC, Deloglos C, Jayakumar A, Tantawy DA, Hite R, Gautham S. Realization Of An Automated T-Way Combinatorial Testing Approach For A Software Based Embedded Digital Device. Idaho National Lab.(INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); 2019 Jun 17. - [35] Becci G, Dhadyalla G, Mouzakitis A, Marco J, Moore AD. Robustness testing of real-time automotive systems using sequence covering arrays. SAE International Journal of | [
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0.04... | 5 |
According to Digital Identity Guidelines:
• RPs and CSPs SHALL make human support personnel available to intervene and
• RPs and CSPs SHALL educate support personnel on issue handling procedures
for the digital identity management system, the avenues for redress, and the
alternatives available to gain access to services.
• RPs and CSPs SHALL implement a process for personnel and technologies that
provides support functions to report and address major barriers that end users
face and grievances they may have. | [
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0.025220618,
0.048372578,... | 6 |
tegrity, and availability protection. The enhanced security requirements are implemented in addition to the basic and derived requirements since those requirements are not designed to address the APT.
The enhanced security requirements apply to those components of nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI or that provide protection for such components. There is no expectation that all of the enhanced security requirements will be selected by federal agencies implementing this guidance. The decision to select a particular set of enhanced security requirements will be based on the mission and business needs of federal agencies and guided and informed by ongoing risk assessments. The enhanced security requirements for nonfederal systems processing, storing, or transmitting CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets will be conveyed to nonfederal organizations by federal agencies in a contract, grant, or other agreement. The application of the enhanced security requirements to subcontractors will also be addressed by federal agencies in consultation with nonfederal organizations. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
## THE APPLICABILITY OF ENHANCED SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The enhanced security requirements are only applicable to a nonfederal system or nonfederal organization as mandated by a federal agency in a contract, grant, or other agreement. The requirements apply to the components of nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI associated with a critical program or a high value asset or that provide protection for such components. The requirements also apply to services, including externally provided services, that process, store, or transmit CUI, or that provide security protections, for the system requiring enhanced protection. | [
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According to Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information_ A Supplement to NIST Special Publication 800-171:
3.4.3e Employ automated discovery and management tools to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available inventory of system components. 3.4.3. 3.4.3e | Employ automated discovery and management tools to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available inventory of system components. | [
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According to Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)_ NIST Special Publication 800-171, Revision 3. Small Business Primer:
| Access Control | Maintenance | Security Assessment and Monitoring |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Awareness and Training | Media Protection | System and Communications Protection |
| Audit and Accountability | Personnel Security | System and Information Integrity |
| Configuration Management | Physical Protection | Planning |
| Identification and Authentication | Risk Assessment | System and Services Acquisition |
| Incident Response | | Supply Chain Risk Management |
- View all SP 800-171 Access Control Requirements and Assessment Procedures
- NIST Identity and Access Management Resources
- An understanding of the need for security (why is cybersecurity important to our business mission?).
- Specific actions required of users to maintain security (required use of multi-factor authentication, not sharing passwords, etc.).
- How to respond to confirmed or suspected incidents.
- How to securely handle CUI (training should be provided to staff before authorizing access to the system or CUI).
- How to recognize and report insider threats, social engineering, and social mining. | [
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According to Digital Identity Guidelines_ Identity Proofing and Enrollment:
3.9.
4.3.9. Notification of Proofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Visual and tactile inspection by trained personnel for on-site identity proofing | [
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## Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information
RON ROSS VICTORIA PILLITTERI KELLEY DEMPSEY
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-172A
<!-- image -->
## NIST Special Publication 800-172A
## Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information
RON ROSS VICTORIA PILLITTERI KELLEY DEMPSEY
Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory
This publication is available free of charge from:
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-172A
March 2022
<!-- image -->
U.S. Department of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo, Secretary
James K. Olthoff, Performing the Non-Exclusive Functions and Duties of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology & Director, National Institute of Standards and Technology
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
## Authority
This publication has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to further its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. , Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of the appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130. Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. | [
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0.0... | 11 |
ving inputs from a variety of software producers will be particularly helpful to us in refining and revising the SSDF. The publication will be updated periodically to reflect your inputs and feedback.
If you are from a standards-developing organization or another organization that has produced a set of secure practices and you would like to map your secure software development standard or guidance to the SSDF, please contact us at ssdf@nist.gov. We would like to introduce you to the National Online Informative References Program (OLIR) so that you can submit your mapping there to augment the existing set of informative references. ## Patent Disclosure Notice
NOTICE: The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) has requested that holders of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication disclose such patent claims to ITL. However, holders of patents are not obligated to respond to ITL calls for patents and ITL has not undertaken a patent search in order to identify which, if any, patents may apply to this publication. As of the date of publication and following call(s) for the identification of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication, no such patent claims have been identified to ITL. No representation is made or implied by ITL that licenses are not required to avoid patent infringement in the use of this publication. ## Executive Summary
This document describes a set of fundamental, sound practices for secure software development called the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF). Organizations should integrate the SSDF throughout their existing software development practices, express their secure software development requirements to third-party suppliers using SSDF conventions, and acquire software that meets the practices described in the SSDF. | [
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According to Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations:
.......24 |
| 2.3.2. Level 1 -Enterprise...................................................................................................................27 |
| 2.3.3.
Level 2 -Mission and Business Process....................................................................................30 |
| 2.3.4. Level 3 -Operational................................................................................................................32 |
| 2.3.5. C-SCRM PMO..............................................................................................................................33 |
| Critical Success Factors...................................................................................................................37 |
| 3. |
| 3.1.2. The Role of C-SCRM in the Acquisition Process .........................................................................40 |
| 3.4.1. Foundational Practices ...............................................................................................................46 | | [
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According to Guide to Auditing for Controls and Security_ A System Development Life Cycle Approach:
3.6.1 | Potential Deficiencies | Potential Deficiencies | 88 |
| 4. 3.6.1 Potential Deficiencies - The objective of the review is to determine whether the Initiation Phase contains deficiencies. | [
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According to Digital Identity Guidelines_ Authentication and Authenticator Management:
3.2.5. 3.2.5) option. 3.2.5) with a non-exportable authentication
key (see Sec. | [
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According to Addressing Visibility Challenges with TLS 1.3 within the Enterprise_ High-Level Document:
| | 5.4 Specific Details ........................................................................................................... | 5.4 Specific Details ........................................................................................................... | 5.4 Specific Details ........................................................................................................... | [
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. . . . 2.2. 2.3. Evaluation Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.
Cost and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5. Algorithm and Implementation Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6. Selection of the Candidates to Advance to the Second Round . . . . . . . . . 3. Summary of the Second-Round Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. CROSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. LESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. HAWK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Mirath (MIRA/MiRitH)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5. MQOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6. PERK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7. RYDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8. SDitH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9. UOV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10. MAYO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11. QR-UOV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12. SNOVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13. FAEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14. SQIsign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | [
0.021892887,
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0.022123015,
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0.011606145,
... | 17 |
|
| Federal Vulnerability Disclosure Coordination Body ....................................................
| 6 | |
| Preparation................................................................................................................. | 7 | |
| 2.1.1. Create Source Vulnerability | Report Receipt Capability............................................. 7 | |
| 2.1.2. Determine Scope and Obtain Contacts .................................................................... | 8 | |
| 2.1.3. Develop Technical Analysis Capability ..................................................................... | [
0.016347058,
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0.0021042274,
0.013886211,... | 18 |
l official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.
## NIST Technical Series Policies
Copyright, Use, and Licensing Statements NIST Technical Series Publication Identifier Syntax
## Publication History
Approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 2023-03-30 Supersedes NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140Cr1 (May 2022) https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-140Cr1
## How to Cite this NIST Technical Series Publication:
Calis A (2023) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)-Approved Security Functions: CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) NIST SP 800-140Cr2. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-140Cr2
## Author ORCID iDs
Alexander Calis: 0000-0003-1937-8129
## Contact Information
sp800-140-comments@nist.gov
National Institute of Standards and Technology Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). ## Abstract
The approved security functions listed in this publication replace the ones listed in International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 19790 Annex C and ISO/IEC 24759 6.15, within the context of the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). As a validation authority, the CMVP may supersede Annex C in its entirety. This document also supersedes SP 800-140Cr1. ## Keywords
Cryptographic Module Validation Program; CMVP; FIPS 140 testing; FIPS 140; ISO/IEC 19790; ISO/IEC 24759; testing requirement; vendor evidence; vendor documentation; security policy. | [
0.019638753,
0.028740263,
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0.0... | 19 |
According to Audit and Evaluation of Computer Security:
3.3.7 Encryption
Enciphering may be indicated for very sensitive data
that must be passed outside the control of its owner. | [
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0.... | 20 |
According to Guidelines for Media Sanitization:
| Executive Summary............................................................................................................................1 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Introduction...................................................................................................................................2 |
| 2. Background....................................................................................................................................5 |
| 3. Summary of Sanitization Methods..................................................................................................8 |
| 3.1.1. Clear Sanitization Method............................................................................................................8 |
| 3.1.2. Purge Sanitization Method.........................................................................................................10 |
| 3.1.3. Destroy Sanitization Method......................................................................................................11 |
| 3.2.1. Strength of Cryptography for CE ................................................................................................12 |
| 3.2.2. Applicability of CE.......................................................................................................................13 |
| 3.2.3. Sanitization of Keys ....................................................................................................................13 |
| 3.2.4. Quality of Cryptographic Implementations................................................................................15 |
| 3.2.5. | [
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0.054500505,
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-0.013457519,
0.024582494,
0.0102520175,
-0.033717126,
0.046790544,
0.0473213,
... | 21 |
According to Overview and Considerations of Access Control Based on Attribute Encryption:
In addition to functionalities like revocation, accountability, attribute privacy protection, policy updating, decentralization (multi-authorities), and key hierarchy for practical access control system deployments [ZDXSLZ], the applicable access policy structure for fundamental ABE is restricted to supporting non-monotone and stated policy rules [TKN]. For example, CP-ABE allows data owners to define their own access policies by attributes and, thus, support complex access control policy structure. However, by only associating attributes, decryption keys are organized logically as a static set. Users can only use all possible combinations of attributes in the set of keys issued to compose their policies, and it has restrictions for specifying policies, attribute managements (e.g., applying environment conditions and dynamic attributes), and the application of deny rules. This may fail to satisfy the enterprise requirements of access control in terms of flexibility and dynamic properties [BS]. However, research has introduced methods to handle the non-monotone restriction [AG, AN, AT, TKN] to address the deny rule issue. The policy issue can be addressed by combining various technologies, such as refreshing user secret keys more frequently, shortening the expiration time interval, or allowing dynamic attributes to be updated closer to real-time. In KP-ABE, the secret key and ciphertext relate to a set of attributes to offer fine-grained access control [BCSES] for which permission evaluation depends only on the resources' attributes. The resource provider (i.e., data owner or encrypted) cannot specify the access policy except by choosing descriptive attributes for permissions. This means that there is no choice but to trust the key issuer. Such accountability for user secret keys provides fine-grained access without flexibility or scalability [BS]. | [
0.020383036,
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0.04453101,
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0.030069651,
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0.03286219,
-0.02115597,... | 22 |
According to Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning_ Preventive Maintenance for Technology:
installations require administrator privileges, such as installing firmware patches for a system basic input/output system (BIOS). 3 Some patch installations require user participation or cooperation.
- Change software configuration and state. In some cases, making a patch take effect necessitates implementing changes. Examples include restarting patched software, rebooting the operating system or platform on which the patched software runs, redeploying the applications, or altering software configuration settings. In other cases, no such changes are needed. - Resolve any issues. Installing a patch may cause side effects to occur, like inadvertently altering existing security configuration settings or adding new settings, and these side effects can inadvertently create a new security problem while fixing the original one. Patch installation can also cause operational issues that may necessitate uninstalling the patch, reverting to the previous version of the software, or restoring the software or asset from backups. | [
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0.058067806,
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0.0446... | 23 |
oners in these fields, but since the report contains initial findings from a small group exercise, it is not intended as a specific recommendation or guideline for practice. ## Table of Contents
| 1.
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................1 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2. Background......................................................................................................................................2 |
| 3. Report from the Design-A-Thon .......................................................................................................4 |
| 4. Designs ............................................................................................................................................6 |
| 5. Discussion......................................................................................................................................14 |
| References.........................................................................................................................................16 |
| Appendix A. | [
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0.018512376,
0.019121716,
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0.051271733,
0.06963903,
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0.014711245,
0.039723262,
0.038214415,
... | 24 |
According to Likely Exploited Vulnerabilities_ A Proposed Metric for Vulnerability Exploitation Probability:
Additional information about this publication is available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/cswp, including related content, potential updates, and document history. | [
0.0047573647,
0.010257564,
0.060253497,
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0.012259984,
0.006146141,
0.036172766,
-0.0038853427,
0.0010141294,
0.0030908338,
0.020967286,
-0.042373814,
0.013487275,
0.01130399,
-0.004799351,
0.056997947,
-0.013913597,
-0.03010091,
-0.017892601,
0.0132... | 25 |
According to Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)_ NIST Special Publication 800-171, Revision 3. Small Business Primer:
ource code. | CUI//SP-CTI |
| General Proprietary | e.g., financial information, trade secrets, product research and development, existing and future product designs and performance specifications.
| CUI//PROPIN |
| Business Information | you do not handle CUI, implementing the security requirements in SP 800-171 will | help you take |
| Access Control | Maintenance | Security Assessment and Monitoring |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Awareness and Training | Media Protection | System and Communications Protection |
| Audit and Accountability | Personnel Security | System and Information Integrity |
| Configuration Management | Physical Protection | Planning |
| Identification and Authentication | Risk Assessment | System and Services Acquisition |
| Incident Response | | Supply Chain Risk Management | | [
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0.048705943,
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0.023472412,
-0.031204823,
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0.02098208,
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0.0024920518,
0.0517879,
0.008922543,
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0.017528636,
0.024229143,
-0.014900716,
-0.00090377725,
-0.007842482,
-0.03769895,
0.012465419,
0.043... | 26 |
According to Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1_ Recommendations for Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities:
3.4.3 SP800161 : SA-1, SA-8, SA-15, SR-3 SP800181 : T0414; K0003, K0039, K0044, K0157, K0168, K0177, K0211, K0260, K0261, K0262, K0524; S0010, S0357, S0368; A0033, A0123, A0151 |
| Define Security Requirements for Software Development (PO. | [
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-0.004340126,
-0.028519012,
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0.011438106,
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0.013598638,
-0.0066722287,
-0.020817354,
0.07767745,
0.011596969,
-0.046692893,
0.0103197135,
0.03... | 27 |
According to Guidelines for the Use of PIV Credentials in Facility Access:
..........................................6 |
| 3. | Threat Environment.............................................................................................................
7 |
| 3.1 | Identifier Collisions .......................................................................................................7 |
| 3.2 | Revoked PIV Cards .......................................................................................................8 |
| 3.3 | Visual Counterfeiting ....................................................................................................8 |
| 3.4 | Skimming.......................................................................................................................9 |
| 3.5 | Sniffing ..........................................................................................................................9 |
| 3.6 | Social Engineering.......................................................................................................10 |
| 3.7 | Electronic Cloning.......................................................................................................10 |
| 3.8 | Electronic Counterfeiting ............................................................................................10 |
| 3.9 | Other Threats ...............................................................................................................11 |
| 4. | PIV Authentication Mechanisms in PACS Applications ................................................ | [
-0.025164122,
0.005584455,
0.052508943,
0.010329627,
0.019023731,
0.013528943,
-0.04725805,
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0.029468132,
-0.024159852,
0.05072995,
0.022653447,
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0.045737296,
-0.009999... | 28 |
According to Guide to Auditing for Controls and Security_ A System Development Life Cycle Approach:
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency | ^ | 3.2.2 | Size of Review Task | Size of Review Task | 49 | |-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | 3.3 | BACKGROUND ON THE METHODOLOGY | BACKGROUND ON THE METHODOLOGY | BACKGROUND ON THE METHODOLOGY | 49 | | | 3.3.1 | The Invitational Workshop | The Invitational Workshop | 49 | | | 3.3.2 | Workshop Points of Agreement | Workshop Points of Agreement | 49 | | 3.4 | AWORK PRIORITY SCHEME FOR THE ADP AUDITOR | AWORK PRIORITY SCHEME FOR THE ADP AUDITOR | AWORK PRIORITY SCHEME FOR THE ADP AUDITOR | 50 | | | 3.4.1 | Assumptions and Caveats | Assumptions and Caveats | 50 | | | 3.4.2 | Audit Planning/Prioritization Process | Audit Planning/Prioritization Process | 51 | | | 3.4.3 | Non-Discretionary Audits | Non-Discretionary Audits | 51 | | | 3.4.4 | Risk Evaluation Levels and Dimensions | Risk Evaluation Levels and Dimensions | 53 | | | 3.4.5 | Two Level Work Priority Dimensions/Characteristics | Two Level Work Priority Dimensions/Characteristics | 54 | | | 3.4.5.1 Level I: | 3.4.5.1 Level I: | 3.4.5.1 Level I: | .....55 | | | 3.4.5.1.1 Mission Impact/Strategic | [
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0.010238961,
0.015956642,
-0.027322447,
-0.0018363355,
0.024846176,
0.030605592,
... | 29 |
According to Protecting Information and System Integrity in Industrial Control System Environments_ Cybersecurity for the Manufacturing Sector:
Although the integration of IT and OT networks is helping manufacturers boost productivity and gain efficiencies, it has also provided malicious actors, including nation states, common criminals, and insider threats a fertile landscape where they can exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities to compromise the integrity of ICS and ICS data to reach their end goal. The motivations behind these attacks can range from degrading manufacturing capabilities to financial gain, and causing reputational harm.
The NCCoE, in conjunction with the NIST EL, collaborated with cybersecurity technology providers to develop and implement example solutions that demonstrate how manufacturing organizations can protect the integrity of their data from destructive malware, insider threats, and unauthorized software within manufacturing environments that rely on ICS.
An organization that is interested in protecting the integrity of a manufacturing system and information from destructive malware, insider threats, and unauthorized software should first conduct a risk assessment and determine the appropriate security capabilities required to mitigate those risks. Once the security capabilities are identified, the sample architecture and solution presented in this document may be used. | [
-0.0042900597,
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0.02181853,
-0.03594908,
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0.010250637,
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0.028500605,
0.02785... | 30 |
According to Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1_ Recommendations for Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities:
3.2.1, 3. 3.2.1, 3. 3.2.1, 3. | [
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0.016955... | 31 |
According to Digital Identity Guidelines_ Authentication and Authenticator Management:
6. Threats and Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1. Authenticator Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Threat Mitigation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | [
0.031167997,
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0.032131955... | 32 |
1. Scope the Target Profile. Decide which of your supplier criticality levels it will apply to, and determine any other restrictions to be placed on the Profile's scope, such as suppliers of a particular type of product or service only. You can create as many Target Profiles as you need to specify the requirements for all of your suppliers. 2. Select the CSF Categories to include. Identify which CSF Categories and Subcategories correspond to your requirements, and only include those Categories and Subcategories in the Target Profile. 3. Determine what types of information to include in your Target Profile. Target Profiles are flexible and can contain whatever types of information you want to communicate to your suppliers. The notional Profile excerpt below captures each selected Category's and Subcategory's relative priority, the internal practices that the supplier must follow, and references to additional sources of information on achieving the Category and Subcategory. 4. Fill in the columns, and share the Target Profile. Once the contents of the Target Profile have been internally reviewed and finalized, it can be shared with your suppliers as your set of C-SCRM requirements for them. | [
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0.03405494,
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-0.015768971,
0.03652159,
-0.009627504,
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0.031991,
0.048074596,
... | 33 |
According to Summary Report for “Workshop on Updating Manufacturer Guidance for Securable Connected Product Development”:
rs. ' Zombie devices ' are those that no longer receive software support and security updates. Higginbotham noted that unsupportive owners can neglect cybersecurity issues, leading to vulnerabilities.
Herd immunity in cybersecurity requires collective action from manufacturers and consumers. Most consumers are unaware or indifferent to the end of life status of their products, resulting in ' zombie hordes ' . Communicating end of life status and dates is crucial, including proactive notification to consumers, retailers, and third parties. Companies should track devices to address critical vulnerabilities and create structured options for off-ramping zombie devices. Higginbotham emphasized that company priorities often overlook device security. Manufacturers should implement vulnerability disclosure programs, track issues, conduct comprehensive security audits, and allocate budgets for security maintenance. Buyers must keep products updated or segmented, and legislation should clarify responsibility to ensure herd immunity. Companies should have a dedicated point of contact for security researchers and consider recalls for insecure devices. Stacey also addressed secure repairs, both before and after end of life. Good hardware should not end up in landfills, but unpatched zombie devices pose risks. Consumer Reports advocates for designing products for longevity, including features like hardware upgrades, crypto agility, and increased memory. | [
0.07708363,
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0.05125052,
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0.01662821... | 34 |
According to Proceedings of the Cybersecurity in Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop, April 23-24, 2012:
Some of the threats to wireless IMDs include device reprogramming, data extraction, data tampering, repeated access attempts and data flooding. Vulnerabilities include unsecured communication channels, inadequate authentication and access control, weak audit mechanisms and meager storage. The resulting risks include patient safety compromise resulting from firmware malfunction or therapy misconfiguration, device unavailability due to battery power depletion, patient privacy loss due to data leakage to unauthorized parties, and inappropriate medical follow-up due to tampering of patient readings. While some cyber threats may be unintentional, various motivations exist for deliberate cyber attacks, such as patient information gathering, negative impact to patient health status, ego satisfaction of the attacker, as well as gaining competitive advantage over another vendor through negative press. ## C. Authentication and Access Control Mechanisms
For each type of data identified, the authentication and access control mechanisms applicable for extracting or updating the data type need to be reviewed to determine adequacy of the protection mechanisms while balancing the needs of patient safety in emergency situations and the utility of the IMD within a patient's environment. This is a non-trivial exercise since the security and privacy requirements for IMDs frequently conflict with the requirements stemming from emergency access to patient data and device utility in hospital and home settings. Creative approaches may be devised to decouple data essential for patient safety in emergency conditions from patient personally identifiable information/data to allow different authentication and access control mechanisms to apply to each group of data. | [
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0.0120... | 35 |
According to Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations:
September 2020
INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 12-10-2020; SEE PAGE XVII
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1
1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY ................................................................................................... 2
1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE .................................................................................................................. 3
1.3 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES......................................................................................... 3
1.4 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PUBLICATIONS ................................................................................... 5
1.5 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONS .................................................................................................... 5
1.6 PUBLICATION ORGANIZATION .................................................................................................. 5
CHAPTER TWO THE FUNDAMENTALS ............................................................................................ 7
2.1 REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLS .............................................................................................. 7
2.2 CONTROL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION .............................................................................. 8
2.3 CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES ............................................................................. 11
2.4 SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS ......................................................................................... 13
2.5 TRUSTWORTHINESS AND ASSURANCE ..................................................................................... 14
CHAPTER THREE THE CONTROLS ................................................................................................. | [
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0.018088143,
0.02414965... | 36 |
ation Processing Guidelines. latter effort will be carried out by a working group convened for this
purpose and will result in a FIPS publication by NBS. These Proceedings are the result of phase one.
Task Group 15
This
The General Chairman and organizer of the Workshop was Robert G. General Accounting Office. McKenzie of the U.S. project on computer security auditing, he initiated and planned the
Workshop and co-edited these Proceedings. Mr. McKenzie is an audit
manager at GAG and has conducted a number of reviews of computer securi-
ty of proposed and on-going systems in the Federal Government. As leader of the TG-15
The General Vice-Chairman of the Workshop was Zella G. Ruthberg of
the National Bureau of Standards. rity audit project, Mrs. Ruthberg worked closely with Mr. McKenzie on
the planning, acted as the Workshop arrangements chairman, and is co-
editor of these Proceedings. in computer science at NBS and most recently has become active in the
managerial procedures required for computer security. She has conducted a wide range of projects
As NBS coordinator of the TG-15 secu-
Mr. S. Jeffery, Chief of the Systems and Software Division of the
Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology of NBS, headed the NBS
Mr. Jeffery has been active in the formulation
staff at the Workshop. of policy concerning the effective utilization of computers within the
Federal Government and is manager of the computer program at NBS. program provided the needed technical and administrative support for
this Workshop. This
I would like to thank all of the particitpants in this Workshop,
the Chairmen and Recorders of the sessions, and the three individuals
named above for the success of the Workshop. from the Workshop and subsequent efforts in this area will have far-
reaching, beneficial effects on the use of computers throughout the
country
The products to be derived
Dennis K. | [
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0.031469412,
0.025800094,
0.0010554583,
0.04390707... | 37 |
IoT Product Capabilities..............................................................................................5 | 2.2.1. IoT Product Capabilities..............................................................................................5 | |
| 2.2.2. IoT Product | 2.2.2. | [
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0.0025909024,
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0.014... | 38 |
blication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in
information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government,
and academic organizations.
i
NIST SP 800-63-4
July 2025
Patent Disclosure Notice
Digital Identity Guidelines
NOTICE: ITL has requested that holders of patent claims whose use may be required for
compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication disclose such patent
claims to ITL. However, holders of patents are not obligated to respond to ITL calls for
patents and ITL has not undertaken a patent search in order to identify which, if any,
patents may apply to this publication. As of the date of publication and following call(s) for the identification of patent claims
whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this
publication, no such patent claims have been identified to ITL. No representation is made or implied by ITL that licenses are not required to avoid
patent infringement in the use of this publication. ii
NIST SP 800-63-4
July 2025
Table of Contents
Digital Identity Guidelines
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. Scope and Applicability
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. How to Use This Suite of SPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. Enterprise Risk Management Requirements and Considerations . . . . . 1.3.1. Security, Fraud, and Threat Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3. Customer Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5. Document Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Digital Identity Model
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | [
0.033553004,
0.000008379677,
0.057607453,
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0.022950564,
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0.015993513,
0.04220439,
0.019459203,
0.0099670645,
0.01980577,
0.00881183... | 39 |
According to Zero Trust Architecture:
3.1.1 | ZTA basada en una gobernanza de la identidad mejorada... 3.1.1 ZTA basada en una gobernanza de la identidad mejorada
Para desarrollar una ZTA, el enfoque de la gobernanza de la identidad mejorada utiliza la identidad de los actores como el componente clave de la creación de las políticas. | [
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0.022621281,
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0.034130353,
-0.008600... | 40 |
According to Strategies for the Integration of Software Supply Chain Security in DevSecOps CI_CD Pipelines:
.............................9 |
| 3.1.5. Types of Exploits.........................................................................................................................10 |
| 3.2.1.
Baseline Security ........................................................................................................................11 |
| 3.2.2. Controls for Interacting With SCM Systems...............................................................................12 |
| 4. CI/CD Pipelines -Background, Security Goals, and Entities to be Trusted .....................................13 |
| 5. Integrating SSC Security Into CI/CD Pipelines.................................................................................15 |
| 5.1.1. Secure Build................................................................................................................................16 |
| 5.1.2. Secure Pull-Push Operations on Repositories............................................................................17 |
| 5.1.3. Integrity of Evidence Generation During Software Updates......................................................18 |
| 5.1.4. Secure Code Commits ................................................................................................................19 | | [
0.025156226,
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0.044235595,
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0.020432515,
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0.0131747285,
0.030974757,
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0.0033090587,
-0.0433745,
0.023864588,
0.048196625... | 41 |
According to Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)_ NIST Special Publication 800-171, Revision 3. Small Business Primer:
| Access Control | Maintenance | Security Assessment and Monitoring |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Awareness and Training | Media Protection | System and Communications Protection |
| Audit and Accountability | Personnel Security | System and Information Integrity |
| Configuration Management | Physical Protection | Planning |
| Identification and Authentication | Risk Assessment | System and Services Acquisition |
| Incident Response | | Supply Chain Risk Management |
Below is an example of the Incident Response Testing requirement, which is part of the Incident Response (IR) family. The structure and content of a typical security requirement includes:
## Family: Incident Response | [
-0.045868356,
0.03636945,
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0.011454184,
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0.03162,
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0.027077043,
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0.0008929423,
0.0122350035,
0.013783738,
0.017487796,
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0.0151001625,
0.026083272,
-0.035388585,
0.040086415,
0.06391112,... | 42 |
According to IoT Non-Technical Supporting Capability Core Baseline:
| 1. The ability for the manufacturer and/or supporting entity to receive maintenance and vulnerability information (e.g., bug reporting capabilities and bug bounty programs) from their customers and others in the IoT device ecosystem 2. The ability for the manufacturer and/or supporting entity to respond to customer and third-party queries about cybersecurity of the IoT device (e.g., customer support). | • This capability provides input from customers and others in the IoT device ecosystem for the manufacturer to use in the Information Dissemination and Education and Awareness non- technical supporting capabilities. • Customers and others in the IoT device ecosystem may want, or be required, to report vulnerabilities they identify in an IoT device. • Manufacturers can use reports of common queries and vulnerabilities to identify ways to improve the cybersecurity of the IoT device. • Some customers may need additional support to securely provision and use an IoT device. • Supports the customers' responsibilities related to cybersecurity, such as enabling them to obtain specialized cybersecurity information that may be used proactively for cybersecurity (e.g., threat intelligence and mitigation, digital forensics investigations, and secure reprovisioning and disposal). | • CTA : VUL-002, VUL-003 • AGELIGHT : 9 • ETSI : Provision 5.2-1 • IoTSF : 2.4.3.11, 2.4.3.12 • CSDE : 5.2.1, 5.2.2 | | [
-0.008194442,
0.012350238,
0.07660477,
0.016672513,
0.024712808,
-0.0094091175,
-0.007454537,
0.012442726,
0.031199303,
0.018053668,
0.035737384,
-0.0045812414,
-0.016524533,
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0.0151187135,
-0.044172294,
0.032111853,
0.0... | 43 |
According to Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations:
aft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications.
## Authority
This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130. Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST. ## NIST Technical Series Policies
Copyright, Use, and Licensing Statements NIST Technical Series Publication Identifier Syntax
## Publication History
Approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 2024-04-23 Supersedes NIST Special Publication 800-171r2 (February 2020; Includes updates as of 01-28-2021) https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r2
## How to Cite this NIST Technical Series Publication:
Ross R, Pillitteri V (2024) Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations. | [
-0.027055494,
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0.0106594,
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0.00798486,
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0.012907565,
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0.0016635124,
0.00852752,
-0.001703889,
-0.012920485,
0.02531123,
0.0122873... | 44 |
According to Recommendations for Federal Vulnerability Disclosure Guidelines:
Commission (2016) ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016 - Information technology - Security Techniques - Information security incident management - Part 1: Principles of incident management (ISO, Geneva, Switzerland).
Available at https://www.iso.org/standard/60803.html |
| [ISOIEC_27036] | International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (2013) ISO/IEC 27036-3:2013 - Information technology - Security Techniques - Information security for supplier relationships - Part 3: Guidelines for information and communication technology supply chain security (ISO, Geneva, |
| [ISOIEC_29147] | Switzerland). Available at https://www.iso.org/standard/59688.html International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (2018) ISO/IEC 29147:2018 - Information technology - Security techniques - Vulnerability disclosure (ISO, Geneva, Switzerland). Available at https://www.iso.org/standard/72311.html |
| [ISOIEC_30111] | International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (2019) ISO/IEC 30111:2019 - Information technology - Security techniques - Vulnerability handling processes (ISO, Geneva, Switzerland). Available at https://www.iso.org/standard/69725.html |
| [NIST_TBF] | National Institute of Standards and Technology (2021) The Bugs Framework (BF) . Available at https://samate.nist.gov/BF/Home/Approach.html |
| [NIST_VULN] | National Institute of Standards and Technology (2021) Vulnerability Data Ontology . | [
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0.038505547,
0.0... | 45 |
According to Profile of the IoT Core Baseline for Consumer IoT Products:
ts related to the IoT product (e.g., price of maintenance) and length and terms of support. - b. All IoT components, including but not limited to the IoT device, that are part of the IoT product. - c.
How the baseline product criteria are met by the IoT product across its product components, including which baseline product criteria are not met by IoT product components and why (e.g., the capability is not needed based on risk assessment). - d. Product design and support considerations related to the IoT product, for example :
- i. All hardware and software components, from all sources (e.g., open source, propriety third-party, internally developed) used to | [
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0.03618595,... | 46 |
.....................................11 | |
| 4.
| Attribute-Based Encryption............................................................................................13 | |
| 4.1. | Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption | ............................................................13 |
| 4.2. | Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption ......................................................................18 | |
| 5. | ABE System Considerations ..........................................................................................22 | |
| 5.1. | Security .....................................................................................................................22 | |
| 5.1.1. | Key Management....................................................................................................22 | |
| 5.1.2. | [
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0.02797209,
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According to Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) Security Policy Requirements_ CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO_IEC 24759 and ISO_IEC 19790 Anne:
CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759 and ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B
CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759 and ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B
Hawes D, Calis A, Crombie R (2023) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) Security Policy Requirements: CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759 and ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) NIST SP 800-140Br1. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-140Br1 | [
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0.030634835,
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0.07878959,
-0.014816849,
0.015868044,
0.00043447842,... | 48 |
According to Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations:
......................98 |
| Table 11. Maintenance (MA) ......................................................................................................................98 |
| Table 12.
Media Protection (MP)................................................................................................................99 |
| Table 13. Physical and Environmental Protection (PE)...............................................................................99 |
| Table 14. Planning (PL)..............................................................................................................................100 |
| Table 15. Program Management (PM) .....................................................................................................100 |
| Table 16. Personnel Security (PS) .............................................................................................................101 |
| Table 17. PII Processing and Transparency (PT) .......................................................................................102 |
| Table 18. Risk Assessment (RA) ................................................................................................................102 |
| Table 19. System and Services Acquisition (SA)........................................................................................103 |
| Table 20. System and Communications Protection (SC)...........................................................................103 |
| Table 21. System and Information Integrity (SI) .......................................................................................104 |
| Table 22. Supply Chain Risk Management (SR).........................................................................................105 |
| Table 23. | [
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0.040248126,
0.091055,
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0.024168745,
0.021415522,
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0.0060350904,
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0.00818161,
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0.030654427,
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0.03318058,
0.01229725,
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0.037721977,
0.030512508,
0... | 49 |
According to Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process:
There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Standardization Process in December 2016 to select quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms for standardization in response to the substantial development and advancement of quantum computing. After three rounds of evaluation and analysis, NIST announced the selection of the first algorithms to be standardized [2]. The key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) selected for standardization was CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM [3]). The digital signatures selected were CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA [4]), Falcon (FN-DSA), and SPHINCS + (SLH-DSA [5]). | [
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0.011507364,
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0.02495477,
0.020370426,
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0.044381753,
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0.010889474,
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0.04270747,
0.0275... | 50 |
According to Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems:
In order for the plans to adequately reflect the protection of the resources, a senior management official must authorize a system to operate. The authorization of a system to process information, granted by a management official, provides an important quality control. By authorizing processing in a system, the manager accepts its associated risk.
Management authorization should be based on an assessment of management, operational, and technical controls. Since the system security plan establishes and documents the security controls, it should form the basis for the authorization, supplemented by the assessment report and the plan of actions and milestones. In addition, a periodic review of controls should also contribute to future authorizations. Re-authorization should occur whenever there is a significant change in processing, but at least every three years.
- Approves system security plans,
- Authorizes operation of an information system,
- Issues an interim authorization to operate the information system under specific terms and conditions, or
- Denies authorization to operate the information system (or if the system is already operational, halts operations) if unacceptable security risks exist. | [
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-0.03794562,
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0.04071428,
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-0.030219136,
0.0131... | 51 |
According to Multi-Factor Authentication for Criminal Justice Information Systems_ Implementation Considerations for Protecting Criminal Justice Information:
3.2.1. 3.2.1. | [
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-0.03729... | 52 |
## Summary of NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations
Kelley Dempsey Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory
Greg Witte Doug Rike G2, Inc. Annapolis Junction, MD
February 19, 2014
<!-- image -->
## Abstract
This white paper provides an overview of NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations , which was published April 30, 2013. ## Keywords
assurance; computer security; FIPS Publication 199; FIPS Publication 200, FISMA; Privacy Act; Risk Management Framework; security controls; security requirements
## Disclaimer
Any mention of commercial products or reference to commercial organizations is for information only; it does not imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor does it imply that the products mentioned are necessarily the best available for the purpose. ## Additional Information
For additional information on NIST's Computer Security Division programs, projects and publications, visit the Computer Security Resource Center, csrc.nist.gov. Information on other efforts at NIST and in the Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) is available at www.nist.gov and www.nist.gov/itl. | [
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0.00549027,
0.0510379,
-0.0051... | 53 |
According to Proceedings of the Cybersecurity in Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop, April 23-24, 2012:
low the audit logs through certain types of attacks on the IMD. Creative techniques for selective overwriting of audit records based on significance of each type of audit record may be useful.
Alert mechanisms when audit log storage space nears depletion may also be useful for alerting the patient or the remote monitoring facility so that appropriate steps can be taken in a timely manner prior to audit space exhaustion. | [
0.016549157,
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0.0010059965,
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0.02191905,
0.04315141... | 54 |
osure Notice
NOTICE: ITL has requested that holders of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication disclose such patent claims to ITL.
However, holders of patents are not obligated to respond to ITL calls for patents and ITL has not undertaken a patent search in order to identify which, if any, patents may apply to this publication. As of the date of publication and following call(s) for the identification of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication, no such patent claims have been identified to ITL. No representation is made or implied by ITL that licenses are not required to avoid patent infringement in the use of this publication. ## Table of Contents
| Executive Summary............................................................................................................................1 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Introduction...................................................................................................................................2 |
| 2. Software Supply Chain (SSC) -Definition and Model .....................................................................4 |
| 2.4.1. Software Supply Chain Defects ....................................................................................................6 |
| 2.4.2. Software Supply Chain Attacks.....................................................................................................6 |
| SSC Security -Risk Factors and Mitigation Measures .....................................................................8 |
| 3. |
| 3.1.1. | [
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0.040415887,
-0.0... | 55 |
According to Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning_ Preventive Maintenance for Technology:
There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. - Prioritize the patch. A patch may be a higher priority to deploy than others because its deployment would reduce cybersecurity risk more than other patches would. Another patch may be a lower priority because it addresses a low-risk vulnerability on a small number of low-importance assets. - Schedule patch deployment. Many organizations schedule patch deployments as part of their enterprise change management activities. - Acquire the patch. | [
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0.0282... | 56 |
According to Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations:
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1
1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY ................................................................................................... 2
1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE .................................................................................................................. 3
1.3 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES......................................................................................... 3
1.4 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PUBLICATIONS ................................................................................... 5
1.5 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONS .................................................................................................... 5
1.6 PUBLICATION ORGANIZATION .................................................................................................. 5
CHAPTER TWO THE FUNDAMENTALS ............................................................................................ 7
2.1 REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLS .............................................................................................. 7
2.2 CONTROL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION .............................................................................. 8
2.3 CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES ............................................................................. 11
2.4 SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS ......................................................................................... 13
2.5 TRUSTWORTHINESS AND ASSURANCE ..................................................................................... 14
CHAPTER THREE THE CONTROLS ................................................................................................. 16
3.1 ACCESS CONTROL .................................................................................................................. | [
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0.03698551,
0.033759214,... | 57 |
Murugiah Souppaya, Gary Stoneburner, Keith
Stouffer, Marianne Swanson, Pat Toth, Glenda Turner, Patrick Viscuso, Joe Weiss, Richard
Wilsher, Mark Wilson, John Woodward, and Carol Woody.
iv
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. NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5 SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Patent Disclosure Notice
NOTICE: The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) has requested that holders of patent
claims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this
publication disclose such patent claims to ITL. However, holders of patents are not obligated to
respond to ITL calls for patents and ITL has not undertaken a patent search in order to identify
which, if any, patents may apply to this publication. As of the date of publication and following call(s) for the identification of patent claims whose
use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication, no
such patent claims have been identified to ITL. No representation is made or implied by ITL that licenses are not required to avoid patent
infringement in the use of this publication. v
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NIST SP 800-53, REV. | [
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... | 58 |
According to Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information_ A Supplement to NIST Special Publication 800-171:
| CHAPTERONE INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... | CHAPTERONE INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1.1 PURPOSEANDAPPLICABILITY | ................................................................................................... 3 |
| 1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE | .................................................................................................................. 4 |
| 1.3 ORGANIZATIONOF THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATION | .......................................................................... 4 |
| CHAPTERTWO THE FUNDAMENTALS............................................................................................ 5 | CHAPTERTWO THE FUNDAMENTALS............................................................................................ 5 |
| 2.1 DEVELOPMENTAPPROACH ...................................................................................................... | [
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... | 59 |
According to Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management_ A CSF 2.0 Community Profile:
public. Sometimes, the media learns of incidents through alternate sources (i.e., not through public affairs personnel). Having a media engagement strategy in place can greatly aid in this situation.
| CSF Element | CSF Element Description regarding cybersecurity- | Priority | Recommendations, Considerations, Notes notifications, data breach reporting, and |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| GV.OC-04 | understood and managed Critical objectives, capabilities, and services that external stakeholders depend on or expect from the organization are understood and communicated | Medium | N1: Understanding critical external dependencies on the organization's operations can aid in prioritizing response and recovery efforts. |
| GV.OC-05 | Outcomes, capabilities, and services that the organization depends on are understood and communicated | Medium | N1: Understanding critical dependencies on external resources (e.g., cloud-based hosting providers and managed service providers) can aid in prioritizing response and recovery efforts. | [
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According to Digital Identity Guidelines_ Identity Proofing and Enrollment:
3.8.1 of [SP800-63C] describes the association of an
RP subscriber account with multiple CSP/IdP accounts. | [
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... | 61 |
According to Assessing Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information:
other than the ones noted above, are available at
Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback https://csrc.nist.gov/publications.
## Authority
This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283 [1]. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130 [2]. Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST. ## NIST Technical Series Policies
Copyright, Use, and Licensing Statements NIST Technical Series Publication Identifier Syntax
## Publication History
Approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 2024-04-23 Supersedes NIST Special Publication 800-171A (June 2018) https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171A
## How to Cite this NIST Technical Series Publication:
Ross R, Pillitteri V (2024) Assessing Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information and Organizations. | [
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According to Guide to a Secure Enterprise Network Landscape:
- applications, supply chain applications) and allocate routing priorities and WAN resources accordingly.
- Integration of security and networking functions: Use of appliances that contain a combination of networking and security functions (e.g., the presence of a firewall and secure web gateway [SWG] functions in a WAN router) [36]
- Centralized visibility and management capabilities: Includes the ability to recognize and authenticate newly connected appliances and bring them under the defined management workflows as nodes so as to configure a uniform set of policies that cover all components
- Integration with remote LAN locations: An additional preferred but non-essential feature is the integration of WAN and LAN functions in a single appliance (the latter going by the name SD-Branch), which can be managed using a single management console, thus providing better visibility into both components. This feature enables the connectivity of SD-WAN into the local LAN at the remote branch offices. | [
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... | 63 |
Profile..........................................................................................................17 Table 2. Highlighted Insights and Key Takeaways from the Consumer Profiling Process.
........20 |
| List of Figures | List of Figures | List of Figures |
## Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank all contributors to this publication, including the participants in workshops and other interactive sessions; the individuals and organizations from the private and public sectors, including manufacturers from various sectors as well as several manufacturer trade organizations, who provided feedback during NIST's Executive Order 14028 response period. Special thanks to Cybersecurity for IoT team members Rebecca Herold, Brad Hoehn, and David Lemire. ## Introduction
On May 12, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 14028, which, among other directives, called for NIST to recommend requirements for a consumer IoT product cybersecurity labeling program. As part of NIST's response to this directive 1 , a profile of the IoT core baseline 2 for consumer IoT products was created. | [
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ft publications during the designated public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications.
## Comments on this publication may be submitted to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
Email: sec-cert@nist.gov
All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [FOIA96]. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
## Reports on Computer Systems Technology
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology (IT). ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the costeffective security of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information systems security and privacy and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. ## Abstract
This publication provides security and privacy control baselines for the Federal Government. There are three security control baselines (one for each system impact level-low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact), as well as a privacy baseline that is applied to systems irrespective of impact level. | [
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0.028581902,
0.021... | 65 |
According to Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1_ Recommendations for Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities:
Personnel within the following Workforce Categories and Specialty Areas from the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework [SP800181] are most likely to find this publication of interest: - Securely Provision (SP): Risk Management (RSK), Software Development (DEV), Systems Requirements Planning (SRP), Test and Evaluation (TST), Systems Development (SYS) - Operate and Maintain (OM): Systems Analysis (ANA) - Oversee and Govern (OV): Training, Education, and Awareness (TEA); Cybersecurity Management (MGT); Executive Cyber Leadership (EXL); Program/Project Management (PMA) and Acquisition - Protect and Defend (PR): Incident Response (CIR), Vulnerability Assessment and Management (VAM) - Analyze (AN): Threat Analysis (TWA), Exploitation Analysis (EXP) | Practices | Tasks | Notional Implementation Examples | References | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Prepare the Organization (PO) | | | | | Define Security Requirements for Software Development (PO.1) : Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. | [
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0.013708927,
0.056367725... | 66 |
According to Guidelines for Media Sanitization:
3.2.5. 3.2.5. | [
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According to Data Integrity_ Detecting and Responding to Ransomware and Other Destructive Events:
3.2.3 Other Considerations
USB attacks do not always come in the form of disguised file-based malware. | [
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th authentication and authorization support. |
| | Provides network and asset monitoring to detect behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities.
|
| | Provides network and asset monitoring to detect behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities. |
| | Offers secure data storage on-prem. |
| | Provides network and asset monitoring to detect behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities. |
<!-- image -->
<!-- image -->
<!-- image -->
| Collaborator | Component |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Real-time data management software that enables detection of behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities. |
| | Access control platform that secures connections and provides control mechanisms to enterprise systems for authorized users and devices; monitors activity down to the keystroke |
| | Provides network and asset monitoring to detect behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities. |
| | Provides host-based application allowlisting (the blocking of unauthorized activities that have the potential to pose a harmful attack) and file integrity monitoring. |
While the NCCoE used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does not endorse these particular products, nor does it guarantee compliance with any regulatory initiatives. | [
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According to Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information_ A Supplement to NIST Special Publication 800-171:
............................................ 5 |
| 2.1 DEVELOPMENTAPPROACH ......................................................................................................
| 5 |
| 2.2 ORGANIZATIONANDSTRUCTURE | ............................................................................................. 7 |
| 2.3 FLEXIBLE APPLICATION | ............................................................................................................. 9 |
| CHAPTER THREE THE REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 11 | CHAPTER THREE THE REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 11 |
| 3.1 ACCESSCONTROL | .................................................................................................................. 12 |
| 3.2 AWARENESSANDTRAINING | ................................................................................................... | [
0.017715218,
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-0.017916527,
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0.004989115,
-0.033095248,
0.032343693,
0.03808772,... | 70 |
According to IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline:
| 1. The ability to update the device's software through remote (e.g., network download) and/or local means (e.g., removable media) 2. The ability to verify and authenticate any update before installing it 3. The ability for authorized entities to roll back updated software to a previous version 4. The ability to restrict updating actions to authorized entities only 5. The ability to enable or disable updating 6. Configuration settings for use with the Device Configuration capability including, but not limited to: a. The ability to configure any remote update mechanisms to be either automatically or manually initiated for update downloads and installations b. The ability to enable or disable notification when an update is available and specify who or what is to be notified | • This capability supports vulnerability management. • Updates can remove vulnerabilities from an IoT device, which lowers the likelihood of an attacker compromising the device. • Updates can correct IoT device operational problems, which can improve device availability, reliability, performance, and other aspects of device operation. • Some authorized entities will need automatic update capabilities to meet their cybersecurity goals and needs, while others would prefer or need more direct control over updates and their application. • Some organizations may want a rollback capability in the event that an update inadvertently impacts critical applications or integration with other systems, while other organizations may prefer to eliminate the risk of someone intentionally or inadvertently rolling software back to a vulnerable version. | [
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0.007753... | 71 |
According to Strategies for the Integration of Software Supply Chain Security in DevSecOps CI_CD Pipelines:
.............................9 |
| 3.1.5. Types of Exploits.........................................................................................................................10 |
| 3.2.1.
Baseline Security ........................................................................................................................11 |
| 3.2.2. Controls for Interacting With SCM Systems...............................................................................12 |
| 4. CI/CD Pipelines -Background, Security Goals, and Entities to be Trusted .....................................13 |
| 5. Integrating SSC Security Into CI/CD Pipelines.................................................................................15 |
| 5.1.1. Secure Build................................................................................................................................16 |
| 5.1.2. Secure Pull-Push Operations on Repositories............................................................................17 |
| 5.1.3. Integrity of Evidence Generation During Software Updates......................................................18 |
| 5.1.4. Secure Code Commits ................................................................................................................19 | | [
0.02515644,
0.024270736,
0.09678771,
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0.044285174,
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0.020432688,
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0.013187141,
0.030925814,
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0.048172... | 72 |
ly the best available for the purpose. There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in
accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities.
The information in this publication, including
concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such
companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and
procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies
may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide
feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications. NIST Technical Series Policies
Copyright, Use, and Licensing Statements
NIST Technical Series Publication Identifier Syntax
Publication History
Approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 2024-10-16
How to cite this NIST Technical Series Publication:
Alagic G, Bros M, Ciadoux P, Cooper D, Dang Q, Dang T, Kelsey J, Lichtinger J, Liu YK, Miller C, Moody D,
Peralta R, Perlner R, Robinson A, Silberg H, Smith-Tone D, Waller N (2024) Status Report on the First Round
of the Additional Digital Signature Schemes for the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization
Process. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST IR 8528. | [
0.01134097,
0.004991994,
0.030836951,
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0.0045462213,
0.0054672654,
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0.020793965,
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0.05878949,
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0.033144478,
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0.026497226,
0.049244... | 73 |
According to Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)-Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and Establishment Methods_ CMVP Validation Authority U:
There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. | [
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According to Data Integrity_ Detecting and Responding to Ransomware and Other Destructive Events:
| Technology Partner/Collaborator | Build Involvement | |-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Symantec Corporation | Symantec Information Centric Analytics v6.5.2 Symantec Security Analytics v8.0.1 | | Cisco Systems | Cisco Identity Services Engine v2.4, Cisco Advanced Malware Protection v5.4, Cisco Stealthwatch v7.0.0 | | Glasswall Government Solutions | Glasswall FileTrust Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) for Email v6.90.2.5 | | Tripwire | Tripwire Log Center v7.3.1, Tripwire Enterprise v8.7 | | Micro Focus | Micro Focus ArcSight Enterprise Security Manager v7.0 Patch 2 | | Semperis | Semperis Directory Services Protector v2.7 | | Component | Product | Function | Cybersecurity Frame- work Subcategories | |----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------| | Mitigation and Containment | Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) v2.4 Glasswall FileTrust ATP for Email v6.90.2.5 Semperis DSP v2.7 | • Provides ability to sandbox files locally. | [
-0.025998183,
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According to Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations:
Balancing exposure to cybersecurity risks throughout the supply chain with the costs and benefits of implementing C-SCRM practices and controls should be a key component of the acquirer's overall approach to C-SCRM. Enterprises should be aware that implementing C-SCRM practices and controls necessitates additional financial and human resources. Requiring a greater level of testing, documentation, or security features from suppliers, developers, system integrators, external system service providers, and other ICT/OT-related service providers may increase the price of a product or service, which may result in increased cost to the acquirer. This is especially true for those products and services developed for general-purpose applications and not tailored to the specific enterprise security or C-SCRM requirements. When deciding whether to require and implement C-SCRM practices and controls, acquirers should consider both the costs of implementing these controls and the risks of not implementing them. | [
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... | 76 |
According to Digital Identity Guidelines:
3.2.2. 3.2.2. 3.2.2)
Digital Identity Guidelines
The impact analysis SHALL consider the level of impact for each impact category for each
type of impacted entity if an intruder obtains unauthorized access as a member of each
user group. | [
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0.0412764... | 77 |
According to Data Integrity_ Detecting and Responding to Ransomware and Other Destructive Events:
3.1.1, A. 3.1.1 Scenario
The following scenario was simulated to test the architecture's defense against ransomware. | [
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0.035283... | 78 |
According to Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography:
3.3.2 | C(0e, 2s) Scheme with Unilateral Key Confirmation Provided by Party V to Party U... 3.3.2 C(0e, 2s) Scheme with Unilateral Key Confirmation Provided by Party V to Party U
Figure\_16 depicts a typical flow for a C(0e, 2s) scheme with unilateral key confirmation from party V to party U. | [
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0.016094556,
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According to Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations:
- Federal agencies responsible for managing and protecting CUI
- Nonfederal organizations responsible for protecting CUI
- Individuals with system development life cycle responsibilities (e.g., program managers, mission/business owners, information owners/stewards, system designers and developers, system/security engineers, systems integrators)
- Individuals with acquisition or procurement responsibilities (e.g., contracting officers)
- Individuals with system, security, or risk management and oversight responsibilities (e.g., authorizing officials, chief information officers, chief information security officers, system owners, information security managers)
- Individuals with security assessment and monitoring responsibilities (e.g., auditors, system evaluators, assessors, analysts, independent verifiers and validators)
| Table 1. Security Requirement Families .......................................................................................................4 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Table 2. Security Control Tailoring Criteria.................................................................................................93 |
| Table 3. Access Control (AC) .......................................................................................................................93 |
| Table 4. Awareness and Training (AT).........................................................................................................94 |
| Table 5. Audit and Accountability (AU).......................................................................................................95 |
| Table 6. Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring (CA).........................................................................95 |
| Table 7. | [
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## Table of Contents | Executive Summary....................................................................................................................1 | Executive Summary....................................................................................................................1 | Executive Summary....................................................................................................................1 | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Introduction .........................................................................................................................2 | Introduction .........................................................................................................................2 | | | Structural Implications of Drivers on the Enterprise Network Landscape .....................2 | Structural Implications of Drivers on the Enterprise Network Landscape .....................2 | | | Security Implications of Drivers on the Enterprise Network Landscape........................3 | Security Implications of Drivers on the Enterprise Network Landscape........................3 | | | The Need for a Security Guide......................................................................................3 | The Need for a Security Guide......................................................................................3 | | | Scope............................................................................................................................4 | Scope............................................................................................................................4 | | | Target Audience............................................................................................................4 | Target Audience............................................................................................................4 | | | Organization of This Document.....................................................................................4 | Organization of This Document.....................................................................................4 | | | Traditional Enterprise Network Access Approaches and Their Limitations .................5 | Traditional Enterprise Network Access Approaches and Their Limitations .................5 | Traditional Enterprise Network Access Approaches and Their Limitations .................5 | | Limitations of Network Perimeter-based Protections ....................................................5 | Limitations of Network Perimeter-based Protections ....................................................5 | | | Limitations of VPN-based Access .................................................................................5 | Limitations of VPN-based Access .................................................................................5 | | | 2.3 Limitation of MPLS Technology as Enterprise WANs.............................................................6 | 2.3 Limitation of MPLS Technology as Enterprise WANs.............................................................6 | 2.3 Limitation of MPLS Technology as Enterprise WANs.............................................................6 | | [
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0.006100394,
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0.019092299,
0.006270338,
0.008878095,
0.0042544533,
0.04193508... | 81 |
| Enterprise Infrastructure Layer ...................................................................................
| 6 |
| | Designing a Policy Framework for ZTA for Cloud-Native Application Environments. 7 | Designing a Policy Framework for ZTA for Cloud-Native Application Environments. 7 |
| | Functional Components of Identity-Based Segmentation Policies for ZTA.................. | 8 |
| | Shortcomings of Identity-Based Segmentation Policies for Enterprise ZTA ................ | [
0.016551586,
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0.047576305,
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0.012857261,
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0.049274553,
0.0358153,... | 82 |
f each application. When a license application is received, TPO will contact you regarding the licensing process and to obtain additional information that may be necessary for the application process.
A license application should include the prospective licensee's intentions for research and development of the invention(s) and a description of the resources and technical capabilities of the prospective licensee to bring the invention to practical application. ## Disclaimer
Any mention of commercial products or reference to commercial organizations is for information only; it does not imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor does it imply that the products mentioned are necessarily the best available for the purpose. ## Additional Information
For additional information on NIST's Cybersecurity programs, projects and publications, visit the Computer Security Resource Center. Information on other efforts at NIST and in the Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) is also available. Submit comments on this publication to:
block-matrix@nist.gov
National Institute of Standards and Technology Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). ## I. BACKGROUND
This document describes a data structure, referred to as a data block matrix, that supports the ongoing addition of hash-linked records while also allowing for the deletion of arbitrary records, thereby preserving hash-based integrity assurance that other blocks are unchanged. (This publication is a final version of [1].)
## II. DATA STRUCTURE
Fig. 1 shows a matrix with numbered data blocks, where a block may contain a single record or multiple transactions. Every row or column is terminated with a block containing a hash of that row or column (e.g., H 0 , -is the hash of row 0). | [
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0.036975674,
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-0.013773643,
-0.018569823,
0.029460292,... | 83 |
| 41 |
## NIST USABLE CYBERSECURITY
We are the Usable Cybersecurity team within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Visualization and Usability Group.
Our multi-disciplinary team conducts research at the intersection of cybersecurity, human factors, cognitive science, and psychology to 'champion the human in cybersecurity.' Through research and other human-centered projects, we seek to better understand and improve people's interactions with cybersecurity systems, products, and services. We provide data and guidance to policymakers, system engineers, and cybersecurity professionals so that they can make better decisions that consider the human element, thereby advancing cybersecurity adoption and empowering people to be active, informed participants in cybersecurity. ## Why Usable Cybersecurity Is Important
<!-- image -->
Security must be usable by people ranging from non-technical users to experts and system administrators. Furthermore, systems must be usable while maintaining security. In the absence of usable security, there is ultimately no effective security. -A Roadmap for Cybersecurity Research [DHS2009]
Usable cybersecurity considers the relationships and interactions between people and cybersecurity, including people's perceptions, the challenges they encounter, and the design of usable systems, products, and services that also result in improved cybersecurity outcomes. When organizations, policy makers, and cybersecurity professionals fail to consider the human element, there can be real consequences, for example: more calls to the help desk, people resorting to less-secure workarounds, user frustration, and the perception that cybersecurity is inconvenient and burdensome. ## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cybersecurity role-based training (RBT) includes specialized training on policies, procedures, and tools for individuals who are assigned roles having security and privacy responsibilities [SP800-53]. | [
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0.011332778,
0.038985327,
... | 84 |
According to Automated Secure Configuration Guidance from the macOS Security Compliance Project (mSCP):
3.4.1. 3.4.1. 3.4.1), guidance (Section 3. | [
0.014802989,
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0.011878153,
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0.01047321... | 85 |
gement is encouraged. For more information on IoT device security and privacy considerations, see NISTIR 8228, Considerations for Managing Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks [4].
## 2 IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline Definition
Table 1 defines the IoT device cybersecurity capability core baseline. The core baseline's role is as a default for minimally securable devices. However, device cybersecurity capabilities will often need to be added or removed from an IoT device's design, integration, or acquisition to best address an organization's common cybersecurity risks. The core baseline does not specify how the device cybersecurity capabilities are to be achieved, so organizations who choose to adopt the core baseline for any of the IoT devices they produce, integrate, or acquire have considerable flexibility in implementing it to effectively address needs. Each row in Table 1 covers one of the device cybersecurity capabilities in the core baseline:
- The first column defines the capability. Note that Figure 1, which is located in Appendix A, indicates how the capability relates to the risk mitigation areas and challenges defined in NISTIR 8228, Considerations for Managing Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks [3]. - The second column provides a numbered list of common elements of that capability-elements an organization seeking to implement the core baseline often (but not always) would use in order to achieve the capability. (Note: the elements are not intended to be comprehensive, nor are they in any particular order.)
- The third column explains the rationale for needing the capability and its common elements to be included in the core baseline. - The last column lists IoT reference examples that indicate existing sources of IoT device cybersecurity guidance specifying a similar or related capability. | [
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0.028738625,
0.0372035... | 86 |
According to Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations:
aft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications.
## Authority
This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130. Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST. ## NIST Technical Series Policies
Copyright, Use, and Licensing Statements NIST Technical Series Publication Identifier Syntax
## Publication History
Approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 2024-04-23 Supersedes NIST Special Publication 800-171r2 (February 2020; Includes updates as of 01-28-2021) https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r2
## How to Cite this NIST Technical Series Publication:
Ross R, Pillitteri V (2024) Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations. | [
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0.0... | 87 |
ework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [NIST CSF] can find in Appendix C a mapping of the enhanced security requirements in this publication to the security controls in [SP 800-53].
The security control mappings can be useful to organizations that wish to demonstrate compliance to the security requirements in the context of their established information security programs when such programs have been built using the NIST security controls. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
## Table of Contents
| CHAPTERONE INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... | CHAPTERONE INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1.1 PURPOSEANDAPPLICABILITY | ................................................................................................... 3 |
| 1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE | .................................................................................................................. | [
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0.036294814,
0.009987731,
0.030338492,
0.029006794,
0.049... | 88 |
According to Secure Software Development Practices for Generative AI and Dual-Use Foundation Models_ An SSDF Community Profile:
The software development and use of AI models and AI systems inherit much of the same risk as any other digital system. A unique challenge for this community is the blurring of traditional boundaries between system code and system data, as well as the use of plain human language as the means of interaction with the systems. AI models and systems, their configuration parameters (e.g., model weights), and the data they interact with (e.g., training data, user queries, etc.) can form closed loops that can be manipulated for unintended functionality.
AI model and system development is still much more of an art than an exact science, requiring developers to interact with model code, training data, and other parameters over multiple iterations. Training datasets may be acquired from unknown, untrusted sources. Model weights and other training parameters can be susceptible to malicious tampering. Some models may be complex to the point that they cannot easily be thoroughly inspected, potentially allowing for undetectable execution of arbitrary code. User queries can be crafted to produce undesirable or objectionable output and - if not sanitized properly - can be leveraged for injection-style attacks. The goal of this document is to identify the practices and tasks needed to address these novel risks.
This Profile's scope is AI model development , which includes data sourcing for, designing, training, fine-tuning, and evaluating AI models, as well as incorporating and integrating AI models into other software. Consistent with SSDF version 1.1 and EO 14110, practices for the deployment and operation of AI systems with AI models are out of scope . Similarly, while cybersecurity practices for training data and other forms of data being used for AI model development are in scope, the rest of the data governance and management life cycle is out of scope. | [
0.027412515,
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0.08687814,
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0.025878327,
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0.010099014,
0.032737795,
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0.04351515,
0.027488591,
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0.019957121,
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0.012292522,
-0.0041397717,
0.003753055,
0.01849... | 89 |
................6 |
| SSC Security -Risk Factors and Mitigation Measures .....................................................................8 |
| 3. |
| 3.1.1.
Developer Environment ...............................................................................................................8 |
| 3.1.2. Threat Actors................................................................................................................................8 |
| 3.1.3. Attack Vectors ..............................................................................................................................9 |
| 3.1.4. Attack Targets (Assets).................................................................................................................9 |
| 3.1.5. Types of Exploits.........................................................................................................................10 |
| 3.2.1. Baseline Security ........................................................................................................................11 |
| 3.2.2. Controls for Interacting With SCM Systems...............................................................................12 |
| 4. CI/CD Pipelines -Background, Security Goals, and Entities to be Trusted .....................................13 |
| 5. Integrating SSC Security Into CI/CD Pipelines.................................................................................15 |
| 5.1.1. Secure Build................................................................................................................................16 |
| 5.1.2. Secure Pull-Push Operations on Repositories............................................................................17 |
| 5.1.3. | [
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0.02021748,
0.03138116,
... | 90 |
According to Status Report on the First Round of the Additional Digital Signature Schemes for the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process:
3.9. UOV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.9. UOV | [
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0.009283289,
0.0006323692,
0.02143... | 91 |
According to Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process:
The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. | [
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0.030930169,
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0.029255606,
-0.029083224,
-0.027457913,
0.037899308,
0.044769943,
-0.093332276,
-0.02499532,
0.03546134,
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0.040558908,
0.0631... | 92 |
According to Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography:
The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in Federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. | Symmetric key | Acryptographic key that is shared between two or more entities and used with a cryptographic application to process information. |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Symmetric-key algorithm | A cryptographic algorithm that uses secret keying material that is shared between authorized parties. | [
-0.0114507675,
-0.047562946,
0.009650368,
-0.0076184073,
0.059511572,
-0.0074736807,
0.006014837,
0.05288888,
-0.03237244,
0.0063506025,
0.006124829,
-0.02632866,
-0.061271448,
-0.014623174,
0.04677563,
-0.03028838,
-0.010402947,
-0.0035544848,
-0.027787505,
0.032534536,
0.00... | 93 |
lishment to be studied: BIKE, Classic McEliece, HQC, and SIKE. This report describes the evaluation and selection process of these fourth-round candidates based on public feedback and internal review.
The report summarizes each of the candidate algorithms and identifies those selected for standardization. The only key-establishment algorithm that will be standardized is HQC, and NIST will develop a standard based on HQC to augment its key-establishment portfolio. ## Keywords
cryptography; key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM); key establishment; post-quantum cryptography; quantum-resistant; quantum-safe. ## Reports on Computer Systems Technology
The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. ## Contents
| 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . | 1 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1.1. | Purpose and Organization of This Document . . . . | 3 |
| 2. Evaluation Criteria and Selection Process . . | . . . . . . . . | 4 |
| 2.1. | Acceptance of the Fourth-Round Candidates . . | [
0.019000923,
0.0044605397,
0.028145378,
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0.038225222,
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0.027866159,
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0.054559592,
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0.028675897,
0.0028620053,
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-0.0025059998,
-0.020927541,
0.044758968,
0.... | 94 |
According to Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops:
Application whitelisting technologies, also known as application control programs, are used to specify which applications are authorized for use on a host. Most application whitelisting technologies can be run in two modes: audit and enforcement. In enforcement mode, the technology generally prohibits all applications that are not in the whitelist from being executed. In audit mode, the technology logs all instances of non-whitelisted applications being run on the host, but does not act to stop them. The tradeoff between enforcement mode and audit mode is simple; using enforcement mode will stop malware from executing, but it may also prevent benign applications not included on the whitelist from being run. Organizations deploying application whitelisting technologies should consider first deploying them in audit mode, so as to identify any necessary applications missing from the whitelist, before reconfiguring them for enforcement mode. Running application whitelisting technologies in audit mode is analogous to intrusion detection software without intrusion prevention capabilities; it can be useful after an infection occurs to determine which hosts were affected, but it has no ability to prevent infections. | [
-0.028820625,
0.030237231,
0.07205156,
0.009012551,
0.0155948885,
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0.07210041,
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0.021090347,
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0.018965436,
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0.043719422,
0.053244... | 95 |
ify, add, or delete Vendor Evidence (VE) and/or Test Evidence (TE) specified under paragraph 6.14 of the ISO/IEC 24759 and specify the order of the security policy as stated in ISO/IEC 19790:2012 B.1.
## Keywords
CMVP; Cryptographic Module Validation Program; FIPS 140; FIPS 140 testing; ISO/IEC 19790; ISO/IEC 24759; security policy; testing requirement; vendor documentation; vendor evidence. ## Reports on Computer Systems Technology
The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. ## Supplemental Content
See https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cmvp/sp800-140-series-info for details about the NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140x series publications and their relationships to ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 24759. ## Audience
This document is intended for vendors, testing labs, and CMVP to address issues in ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology - Security techniques - Security requirements for cryptographic modules , and ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology - Security techniques - Test requirements for cryptographic modules . | [
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0.014426574,
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0.0015485217,
0.019349027,
0.0062950603,
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0.020447113,
0.019121837,
0.04349429,
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0.018730566,
0.01725383,
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0.050638158,
-0.028045362,
0.010564342,
0.048997343... | 96 |
According to Blockchain for Access Control Systems:
hemes may use the blockchain as a database for storing only the policies but not use the blockchain for access enforcement, such that PDP and PEP functions are performed off-the-chain.
However, the main problems of the traditional mechanism, like single point of failure, will be inherited [GBHC]. In addition, considerations should include governance frameworks for legal processes, applicable smart contracts, and the responsibilities of participating AC nodes even though the AC system is based on permissioned blockchains. | [
0.02425613,
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0.03882952,
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0.051739845,
0.018330688,
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0.015263254,
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0.04124405,
-0.006572192,
-0.0007325... | 97 |
According to Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1_ Recommendations for Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities:
| Practices | Tasks | Notional Implementation Examples | References | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Prepare the Organization (PO) | | | | | Define Security Requirements for Software Development (PO.1) : Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. | [
0.023728056,
0.015227201,
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0.014256018,
0.028775813,
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0.026138032,
0.015239191,
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0.019699443,
0.046880595,
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0.04959032,
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0.020742565,
0.0466408,
... | 98 |
According to Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography:
3.2.2 rsakpg2-prime-factor ... 3.2.2 rsakpg2-prime-factor
rsakpg2-prime-factor is the generator in the RSAKPG2 family such that the private key is in the prime-factor format ( p , q , d ). 3.2.2). | [
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0.037197042,
-0.011664... | 99 |
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