Daily Papers

Large-scale distributed training in production datacenters constitutes a challenging workload bottlenecked by network communication. In response, both major industry players (e.g., Ultra Ethernet Consortium) and parts of academia have surprisingly, and almost unanimously, agreed that packet spraying is necessary to improve the performance of large-scale distributed training workloads. In this paper, we challenge this prevailing belief and pose the question: How close can a singlepath transport approach an optimal multipath transport? We demonstrate that singlepath transport (from a NIC's perspective) is sufficient and can perform nearly as well as an ideal multipath transport with packet spraying, particularly in the context of distributed training in leaf-spine topologies. Our assertion is based on four key observations about workloads driven by collective communication patterns: (i) flows within a collective start almost simultaneously, (ii) flow sizes are nearly equal, (iii) the completion time of a collective is more crucial than individual flow completion times, and (iv) flows can be split upon arrival. We analytically prove that singlepath transport, using minimal flow splitting (at the application layer), is equivalent to an ideal multipath transport with packet spraying in terms of maximum congestion. Our preliminary evaluations support our claims. This paper suggests an alternative agenda for developing next-generation transport protocols tailored for large-scale distributed training.

The growing scale of modern farms has increased the need for efficient and adaptive multi-agent coverage strategies for pest, weed, and disease management. Traditional methods such as manual inspection and blanket pesticide spraying often lead to excessive chemical use, resource waste, and environmental impact. While unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offer a promising platform for precision agriculture through targeted spraying and improved operational efficiency, existing UAV-based approaches remain limited by battery life, payload capacity, and scalability, especially in large fields where single-UAV or uniformly distributed spraying is insufficient. Although multi-UAV coordination has been explored, many current frameworks still assume uniform spraying and do not account for infestation severity, UAV dynamics, non-uniform resource allocation, or energy-efficient coordination. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a Density-Driven Optimal Control (D2OC) framework that integrates Optimal Transport (OT) theory with multi-UAV coverage control for large-scale agricultural spraying. The method supports non-uniform, priority-aware resource allocation based on infestation intensity, reducing unnecessary chemical application. UAVs are modeled as a linear time-varying (LTV) system to capture variations in mass and inertia during spraying missions. The D2OC control law, derived using Lagrangian mechanics, enables efficient coordination, balanced workload distribution, and improved mission duration. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach outperforms uniform spraying and Spectral Multiscale Coverage (SMC) in coverage efficiency, chemical reduction, and operational sustainability, providing a scalable solution for smart agriculture.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.