Daily Papers

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

We resolve the open question regarding the sample complexity of policy learning for maximizing the long-run average reward associated with a uniformly ergodic Markov decision process (MDP), assuming a generative model. In this context, the existing literature provides a sample complexity upper bound of widetilde O(|S||A|t_{mix}^2 epsilon^{-2}) and a lower bound of Omega(|S||A|t_{mix} epsilon^{-2}). In these expressions, |S| and |A| denote the cardinalities of the state and action spaces respectively, t_{mix} serves as a uniform upper limit for the total variation mixing times, and epsilon signifies the error tolerance. Therefore, a notable gap of t_{mix} still remains to be bridged. Our primary contribution is the development of an estimator for the optimal policy of average reward MDPs with a sample complexity of widetilde O(|S||A|t_{mix}epsilon^{-2}). This marks the first algorithm and analysis to reach the literature's lower bound. Our new algorithm draws inspiration from ideas in Li et al. (2020), Jin and Sidford (2021), and Wang et al. (2023). Additionally, we conduct numerical experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

The rapid proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) and diverse specialized benchmarks necessitates a shift from fragmented, task-specific metrics to a holistic, competitive ranking system that effectively aggregates performance across multiple ability dimensions. Primarily using static scoring, current evaluation methods are fundamentally limited. They struggle to determine the proper mix ratio across diverse benchmarks, and critically, they fail to capture a model's dynamic competitive fitness or its vulnerability when confronted with sequential, high-stakes tasks. To address this, we introduce the novel Competitive Swiss-System Dynamics (CSD) framework. CSD simulates a multi-round, sequential contest where models are dynamically paired across a curated sequence of benchmarks based on their accumulated win-loss record. And Monte Carlo Simulation (N=100,000 iterations) is used to approximate the statistically robust Expected Win Score (E[S_m]), which eliminates the noise of random pairing and early-round luck. Furthermore, we implement a Failure Sensitivity Analysis by parameterizing the per-round elimination quantity (T_k), which allows us to profile models based on their risk appetite--distinguishing between robust generalists and aggressive specialists. We demonstrate that CSD provides a more nuanced and context-aware ranking than traditional aggregate scoring and static pairwise models, representing a vital step towards risk-informed, next-generation LLM evaluation.

This study evaluates Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents for Dhumbal, a culturally significant multiplayer card game with imperfect information, through a systematic comparison of rule-based, search-based, and learning-based strategies. We formalize Dhumbal's mechanics and implement diverse agents, including heuristic approaches (Aggressive, Conservative, Balanced, Opportunistic), search-based methods such as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) and Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (ISMCTS), and reinforcement learning approaches including Deep Q-Network (DQN) and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), and a random baseline. Evaluation involves within-category tournaments followed by a cross-category championship. Performance is measured via win rate, economic outcome, Jhyap success, cards discarded per round, risk assessment, and decision efficiency. Statistical significance is assessed using Welch's t-test with Bonferroni correction, effect sizes via Cohen's d, and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Across 1024 simulated rounds, the rule-based Aggressive agent achieves the highest win rate (88.3%, 95% CI: [86.3, 90.3]), outperforming ISMCTS (9.0%) and PPO (1.5%) through effective exploitation of Jhyap declarations. The study contributes a reproducible AI framework, insights into heuristic efficacy under partial information, and open-source code, thereby advancing AI research and supporting digital preservation of cultural games.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions and future directions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (mixed goods), and (iii) indivisible goods with subsidy which can be viewed like a divisible good.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

Recently, online Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has become a key paradigm for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, existing methods typically treat all training samples uniformly, overlooking the vast differences in problem difficulty relative to the model's current capabilities. This uniform training strategy leads to inefficient exploration of problems the model has already mastered, while concurrently lacking effective guidance on problems that are challenging its abilities the most, limiting both learning efficiency and upper-bound performance. To address this, we propose CLPO (Curriculum-guided Learning for Policy Optimization), a novel algorithm that creates a dynamic pedagogical feedback loop within the policy optimization process. The core of CLPO leverages the model's own rollout performance to conduct real-time difficulty assessment, thereby constructing an Online Curriculum. This curriculum then guides an Adaptive Problem Restructuring mechanism, where the model acts as its own teacher: it diversifies medium-difficulty problems to promote generalization and simplifies challenging problems to make them more attainable. Our approach transforms the static training procedure into a dynamic process that co-evolves with the model's capabilities. Experiments show that CLPO achieves state-of-the-art performance across eight challenging mathematical and general reasoning benchmarks, with an average pass@1 improvement of 6.96% over other methods, demonstrating its potential for more efficiently training more capable reasoning models.

With LLMs shifting their role from statistical modeling of language to serving as general-purpose AI agents, how should LLM evaluations change? Arguably, a key ability of an AI agent is to flexibly combine, as needed, the basic skills it has learned. The capability to combine skills plays an important role in (human) pedagogy and also in a paper on emergence phenomena (Arora & Goyal, 2023). This work introduces Skill-Mix, a new evaluation to measure ability to combine skills. Using a list of N skills the evaluator repeatedly picks random subsets of k skills and asks the LLM to produce text combining that subset of skills. Since the number of subsets grows like N^k, for even modest k this evaluation will, with high probability, require the LLM to produce text significantly different from any text in the training set. The paper develops a methodology for (a) designing and administering such an evaluation, and (b) automatic grading (plus spot-checking by humans) of the results using GPT-4 as well as the open LLaMA-2 70B model. Administering a version of to popular chatbots gave results that, while generally in line with prior expectations, contained surprises. Sizeable differences exist among model capabilities that are not captured by their ranking on popular LLM leaderboards ("cramming for the leaderboard"). Furthermore, simple probability calculations indicate that GPT-4's reasonable performance on k=5 is suggestive of going beyond "stochastic parrot" behavior (Bender et al., 2021), i.e., it combines skills in ways that it had not seen during training. We sketch how the methodology can lead to a Skill-Mix based eco-system of open evaluations for AI capabilities of future models.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

Modern chess language models are dense transformers trained on millions of games played by thousands of high-rated individuals. However, these monolithic networks tend to collapse into mode-averaged behavior, where stylistic boundaries are blurred, and rare but effective strategies are suppressed. To counteract homogenization, we introduce Mixture-of-Masters (MoM), the first chess mixture-of-experts model with small-sized GPT experts emulating world-class grandmasters. Each expert is trained with a combination of self-supervised learning and reinforcement learning guided by chess-specific rewards. For each move, a post-hoc learnable gating network selects the most appropriate persona to channel depending on the game state, allowing MoM to switch its style dynamically--e.g., Tal's offensive vocation or Petrosian's defensive solidity. When evaluated against Stockfish on unseen standard games, MoM outperforms both dense individual expert networks and popular GPT baselines trained on aggregated data, while ensuring generation variety, control, and interpretability.

Test-time compute scaling has emerged as a powerful paradigm for enhancing mathematical reasoning in large language models (LLMs) by allocating additional computational resources during inference. However, current methods employ uniform resource distribution across all reasoning sub-problems, creating fundamental bottlenecks where challenging sub-problems receive insufficient attention while routine operations consume disproportionate resources. This uniform allocation creates performance bottlenecks where additional computational resources yield diminishing returns. Inspired by dual-process theory, we propose SCALE (Selective Resource Allocation), a framework that selectively allocates computational resources based on sub-problem difficulty. SCALE operates through four stages: (1) problem decomposition into sequential reasoning sub-problems, (2) difficulty assessment of each sub-problem to distinguish between routine operations and computationally challenging sub-problems, (3) selective processing mode assignment between System 1 for simple sub-problems and System 2 for complex ones, and (4) sequential execution with context propagation. By concentrating resources on challenging sub-problems while processing routine operations efficiently, SCALE achieves substantial performance improvements with superior resource utilization. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SCALE significantly outperforms uniform scaling baselines, achieving accuracy improvements of up to 13.75 percentage points (57.50% to 71.25% on AIME25) while reducing computational costs by 33%-53%, representing a major advance in test-time scaling that addresses fundamental limitations of current approaches.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can self-improve through reinforcement learning, where they generate trajectories to explore and discover better solutions. However, this exploration process is computationally expensive, often forcing current methods to assign limited exploration budgets to each task. This uniform allocation creates problematic edge cases: easy tasks consistently succeed while difficult tasks consistently fail, both producing zero gradients during training updates for the widely used Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We address this problem from the lens of exploration budget allocation. Viewing each task's exploration as an "item" with a distinct "value" and "cost", we establish a connection to the classical knapsack problem. This formulation allows us to derive an optimal assignment rule that adaptively distributes resources based on the model's current learning status. When applied to GRPO, our method increases the effective ratio of non-zero policy gradients by 20-40% during training. Acting as a computational "free lunch", our approach could reallocate exploration budgets from tasks where learning is saturated to those where it is most impactful. This enables significantly larger budgets (e.g., 93 rollouts) for especially challenging problems, which would be computationally prohibitive under a uniform allocation. These improvements translate to meaningful gains on mathematical reasoning benchmarks, with average improvements of 2-4 points and peak gains of 9 points on specific tasks. Notably, achieving comparable performance with traditional homogeneous allocation would require about 2x the computational resources.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated impressive action sequence prediction capabilities but often struggle with dynamic, long-horizon tasks such as real-time strategic games. In a game such as StarCraftII (SC2), agents need to manage resource constraints and adapt to evolving battlefield situations in a partially observable environment. This often overwhelms exisiting LLM-based approaches. To address these challenges, we propose a hierarchical multi-agent framework that employs specialized imitation learning agents under a meta-controller called Strategic Planner (SP). By expert demonstrations, each specialized agent learns a distinctive strategy, such as aerial support or defensive maneuvers, and produces coherent, structured multistep action sequences. The SP then orchestrates these proposals into a single, environmentally adaptive plan that ensures local decisions aligning with long-term strategies. We call this HIMA (Hierarchical Imitation Multi-Agent). We also present TEXTSCII-ALL, a comprehensive SC2 testbed that encompasses all race match combinations in SC2. Our empirical results show that HIMA outperforms state of the arts in strategic clarity, adaptability, and computational efficiency, underscoring the potential of combining specialized imitation modules with meta-level orchestration to develop more robust, general-purpose AI agents.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning for foundation models, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), have significantly improved the performance of foundation models on reasoning tasks. Notably, the advantage function serves as a central mechanism in GRPO for ranking the trajectory importance. However, existing explorations encounter both advantage reversion and advantage mirror problems, which hinder the reasonable advantage allocation across different query samples. In this work, we propose an easy but effective GRPO strategy, Mixed Advantage Policy Optimization (MAPO). We reveal that the trajectory appears with different certainty and propose the advantage percent deviation for samples with high-certainty trajectories. Furthermore, we dynamically reweight the advantage function for samples with varying trajectory certainty, thereby adaptively configuring the advantage function to account for sample-specific characteristics. Comparison with related state-of-the-art methods, along with ablation studies on different advantage variants, validates the effectiveness of our approach.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

This paper presents a simple, effective, and cost-efficient strategy to improve LLM performance by scaling test-time compute. Our strategy builds upon the repeated-sampling-then-voting framework, with a novel twist: incorporating multiple models, even weaker ones, to leverage their complementary strengths that potentially arise from diverse training data and paradigms. By using consistency as a signal, our strategy dynamically switches between models. Theoretical analysis highlights the efficiency and performance advantages of our strategy. Extensive experiments on six datasets demonstrate that our strategy not only outperforms self-consistency and state-of-the-art multi-agent debate approaches, but also significantly reduces inference costs. Additionally, ModelSwitch requires only a few comparable LLMs to achieve optimal performance and can be extended with verification methods, demonstrating the potential of leveraging multiple LLMs in the generation-verification paradigm.

When finetuning large language models for specialized tasks such as mathematical reasoning, models exhibit catastrophic forgetting, losing previously learned capabilities. We investigate this by finetuning Flan-T5-Base (250M parameters) on the DeepMind Mathematics dataset and measuring forgetting on MultiNLI. Math-only training improves mathematical accuracy from 3.1\% to 12.0\% but causes NLI accuracy to collapse from 81.0\% to 16.5\%--a 64.5 percentage point drop occurring within the first 1,000 training steps. We propose mixed training strategies that interleave mathematical and NLI examples during training. Our results demonstrate that mixed training completely eliminates catastrophic forgetting while maintaining equivalent mathematical performance: the balanced 1:1 ratio achieves 12.0\% math accuracy (matching math-only) while preserving 86.2\% NLI accuracy. We systematically explore mixing ratios from 1:1 to 15:1, finding that even minimal NLI exposure (6.2\%) provides effective regularization. These findings demonstrate that specialization need not require forgetting general capabilities, with implications for scaling to larger models where mixed training may confer additional benefits beyond forgetting prevention.

Alignment has quickly become a default ingredient in LLM development, with techniques such as reinforcement learning from human feedback making models act safely, follow instructions, and perform ever-better on complex tasks. While these techniques are certainly useful, we propose that they should not be universally applied and demonstrate a range of tasks on which base language models consistently outperform their popular aligned forms. Particularly, we study tasks that require unpredictable outputs, such as random number generation, mixed strategy games (rock-paper-scissors and hide-and-seek), and creative writing. In each case, aligned models tend towards narrow behaviors that result in distinct disadvantages, for instance, preferring to generate "7" over other uniformly random numbers, becoming almost fully predictable in some game states, or prioritizing pleasant writing over creative originality. Across models tested, better performance on common benchmarks tends to correlate with worse performance on our tasks, suggesting an effective trade-off in the required capabilities.

Alignment and uniformity are fundamental principles within the domain of contrastive learning. In recommender systems, prior work has established that optimizing the Bayesian Personalized Ranking (BPR) loss contributes to the objectives of alignment and uniformity. Specifically, alignment aims to draw together the representations of interacting users and items, while uniformity mandates a uniform distribution of user and item embeddings across a unit hypersphere. This study revisits the alignment and uniformity properties within the context of multimodal recommender systems, revealing a proclivity among extant models to prioritize uniformity to the detriment of alignment. Our hypothesis challenges the conventional assumption of equitable item treatment through a uniformity loss, proposing a more nuanced approach wherein items with similar multimodal attributes converge toward proximal representations within the hyperspheric manifold. Specifically, we leverage the inherent similarity between items' multimodal data to calibrate their uniformity distribution, thereby inducing a more pronounced repulsive force between dissimilar entities within the embedding space. A theoretical analysis elucidates the relationship between this calibrated uniformity loss and the conventional uniformity function. Moreover, to enhance the fusion of multimodal features, we introduce a Spherical B\'ezier method designed to integrate an arbitrary number of modalities while ensuring that the resulting fused features are constrained to the same hyperspherical manifold. Empirical evaluations conducted on five real-world datasets substantiate the superiority of our approach over competing baselines. We also shown that the proposed methods can achieve up to a 5.4% increase in NDCG@20 performance via the integration of MLLM-extracted features. Source code is available at: https://github.com/enoche/CM3.

We introduce Pok\'eLLMon, the first LLM-embodied agent that achieves human-parity performance in tactical battle games, as demonstrated in Pok\'emon battles. The design of Pok\'eLLMon incorporates three key strategies: (i) In-context reinforcement learning that instantly consumes text-based feedback derived from battles to iteratively refine the policy; (ii) Knowledge-augmented generation that retrieves external knowledge to counteract hallucination and enables the agent to act timely and properly; (iii) Consistent action generation to mitigate the panic switching phenomenon when the agent faces a powerful opponent and wants to elude the battle. We show that online battles against human demonstrates Pok\'eLLMon's human-like battle strategies and just-in-time decision making, achieving 49\% of win rate in the Ladder competitions and 56\% of win rate in the invited battles. Our implementation and playable battle logs are available at: https://github.com/git-disl/PokeLLMon.

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied extensively to solve complex decision-making problems. In many real-world scenarios, tasks often have several conflicting objectives and may require multiple agents to cooperate, which are the multi-objective multi-agent decision-making problems. However, only few works have been conducted on this intersection. Existing approaches are limited to separate fields and can only handle multi-agent decision-making with a single objective, or multi-objective decision-making with a single agent. In this paper, we propose MO-MIX to solve the multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning (MOMARL) problem. Our approach is based on the centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE) framework. A weight vector representing preference over the objectives is fed into the decentralized agent network as a condition for local action-value function estimation, while a mixing network with parallel architecture is used to estimate the joint action-value function. In addition, an exploration guide approach is applied to improve the uniformity of the final non-dominated solutions. Experiments demonstrate that the proposed method can effectively solve the multi-objective multi-agent cooperative decision-making problem and generate an approximation of the Pareto set. Our approach not only significantly outperforms the baseline method in all four kinds of evaluation metrics, but also requires less computational cost.

Enabling agentic AI systems to adapt their problem-solving approaches based on post-training interactions remains a fundamental challenge. While systems that update and maintain a memory at inference time have been proposed, existing designs only steer the system by modifying textual input to a language model or agent, which means that they cannot change sampling parameters, remove tools, modify system prompts, or switch between agentic and workflow paradigms. On the other hand, systems that adapt more flexibly require offline optimization and remain static once deployed. We present Experience-Guided Reasoner (EGuR), which generates tailored strategies -- complete computational procedures involving LLM calls, tools, sampling parameters, and control logic -- dynamically at inference time based on accumulated experience. We achieve this using an LLM-based meta-strategy -- a strategy that outputs strategies -- enabling adaptation of all strategy components (prompts, sampling parameters, tool configurations, and control logic). EGuR operates through two components: a Guide generates multiple candidate strategies conditioned on the current problem and structured memory of past experiences, while a Consolidator integrates execution feedback to improve future strategy generation. This produces complete, ready-to-run strategies optimized for each problem, which can be cached, retrieved, and executed as needed without wasting resources. Across five challenging benchmarks (AIME 2025, 3-SAT, and three Big Bench Extra Hard tasks), EGuR achieves up to 14% accuracy improvements over the strongest baselines while reducing computational costs by up to 111x, with both metrics improving as the system gains experience.

Multi-turn, multi-agent LLM game evaluations often exhibit substantial run-to-run variance. In long-horizon interactions, small early deviations compound across turns and are amplified by multi-agent coupling. This biases win rate estimates and makes rankings unreliable across repeated tournaments. Prompt choice worsens this further by producing different effective policies. We address both instability and underperformance with MEMO (Memory-augmented MOdel context optimization), a self-play framework that optimizes inference-time context by coupling retention and exploration. Retention maintains a persistent memory bank that stores structured insights from self-play trajectories and injects them as priors during later play. Exploration runs tournament-style prompt evolution with uncertainty-aware selection via TrueSkill, and uses prioritized replay to revisit rare and decisive states. Across five text-based games, MEMO raises mean win rate from 25.1% to 49.5% for GPT-4o-mini and from 20.9% to 44.3% for Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct, using 2,000 self-play games per task. Run-to-run variance also drops, giving more stable rankings across prompt variations. These results suggest that multi-agent LLM game performance and robustness have substantial room for improvement through context optimization. MEMO achieves the largest gains in negotiation and imperfect-information games, while RL remains more effective in perfect-information settings.

Cross-platform strategy game automation remains a challenge due to diverse user interfaces and dynamic battlefield environments. Existing Vision--Language Models (VLMs) struggle with generalization across heterogeneous platforms and lack precision in interface understanding and action execution. We introduce Yanyun-3, a VLM-based agent that integrates Qwen2.5-VL for visual reasoning and UI-TARS for interface execution. We propose a novel data organization principle -- combination granularity -- to distinguish intra-sample fusion and inter-sample mixing of multimodal data (static images, multi-image sequences, and videos). The model is fine-tuned using QLoRA on a curated dataset across three strategy game platforms. The optimal strategy (M*V+S) achieves a 12.98x improvement in BLEU-4 score and a 63% reduction in inference time compared to full fusion. Yanyun-3 successfully executes core tasks (e.g., target selection, resource allocation) across platforms without platform-specific tuning. Our findings demonstrate that structured multimodal data organization significantly enhances VLM performance in embodied tasks. Yanyun-3 offers a generalizable framework for GUI automation, with broader implications for robotics and autonomous systems.

Game playing has long served as a fundamental benchmark for evaluating Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in general reasoning, their effectiveness in spatial strategic reasoning, which is critical for complex and fully observable board games, remains insufficiently explored. In this work, we adopt Chinese Chess (Xiangqi) as a challenging and rich testbed due to its intricate rules and spatial complexity. To advance LLMs' strategic competence in such environments, we propose a training framework tailored to Xiangqi, built upon a large-scale dataset of five million board-move pairs enhanced with expert annotations and engine evaluations. Building on this foundation, we introduce Xiangqi-R1, a 7B-parameter model trained in multi-stage manner: (1) fine-tuning for legal move prediction to capture basic spatial rules, (2) incorporating strategic annotations to improve decision-making, and (3) applying reinforcement learning via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with multi-dimensional reward signals to enhance reasoning stability. Our Experimental results indicate that, despite their size and power, general-purpose LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance in these tasks. Compared to general-purpose LLMs, Xiangqi-R1 greatly advances with an 18% rise in move legality and a 22% boost in analysis accuracy. Our results point to a promising path for creating general strategic intelligence in spatially complex areas.

Recent progress in Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning is increasingly driven by the refinement of post-training loss functions and alignment strategies. However, standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) paradigms like Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) remain constrained by static uniformity: uniform prompt sampling and a fixed number of rollouts per prompt. For heterogeneous, heavy-tailed reasoning data, this creates structural inefficiencies that waste compute on already-solved patterns while under-training the long tail of hard problems. To address this, we propose Multi-Adversary Group Distributionally Robust Optimization (GDRO), an optimization-first framework that moves beyond uniform reasoning models by dynamically adapting the training distribution. We introduce an Online Difficulty Classifier that partitions prompts into dynamic pass@k difficulty groups. We then propose two independent GDRO games for post-training: (1) Prompt-GDRO, which employs an EMA-debiased multiplicative-weights bandit sampler to target the intensive difficulty margin and upweight persistently hard groups without frequency bias; and (2) Rollout-GDRO, which uses a shadow-price controller to reallocate rollouts across groups, maximizing gradient variance reduction on hard tasks under a fixed mean budget (compute-neutral). We provide no-regret guarantees for both controllers and additionally a variance-proxy analysis motivating a square-root optimal rollout allocation for Rollout-GDRO. We validate our framework on the DAPO 14.1k dataset using Qwen3-Base models. Prompt-GDRO and Rollout-GDRO achieve average relative gains of +10.6% and +10.1%, respectively, in pass@8 accuracy across 1.7B, 4B, and 8B scales compared to the GRPO baseline. Qualitative analysis shows an emergent curriculum: the adversaries shift resources to the evolving reasoning frontier, enhancing the reasoning model's performance.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Reinforcement learning has recently been used to approach well-known NP-hard combinatorial problems in graph theory. Among these problems, Hamiltonian cycle problems are exceptionally difficult to analyze, even when restricted to individual instances of structurally complex graphs. In this paper, we use Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), the search algorithm behind many state-of-the-art reinforcement learning algorithms such as AlphaZero, to create autonomous agents that learn to play the game of Snake, a game centered on properties of Hamiltonian cycles on grid graphs. The game of Snake can be formulated as a single-player discounted Markov Decision Process (MDP) where the agent must behave optimally in a stochastic environment. Determining the optimal policy for Snake, defined as the policy that maximizes the probability of winning - or win rate - with higher priority and minimizes the expected number of time steps to win with lower priority, is conjectured to be NP-hard. Performance-wise, compared to prior work in the Snake game, our algorithm is the first to achieve a win rate over 0.5 (a uniform random policy achieves a win rate < 2.57 times 10^{-15}), demonstrating the versatility of AlphaZero in approaching NP-hard environments.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

Example-based guidance is widely used to improve mathematical reasoning at inference time, yet its effectiveness is highly unstable across problems and models-even when the guidance is correct and problem-relevant. We show that this instability arises from a previously underexplored gap between strategy usage-whether a reasoning strategy appears in successful solutions-and strategy executability-whether the strategy remains effective when instantiated as guidance for a target model. Through a controlled analysis of paired human-written and model-generated solutions, we identify a systematic dissociation between usage and executability: human- and model-derived strategies differ in structured, domain-dependent ways, leading to complementary strengths and consistent source-dependent reversals under guidance. Building on this diagnosis, we propose Selective Strategy Retrieval (SSR), a test-time framework that explicitly models executability by selectively retrieving and combining strategies using empirical, multi-route, source-aware signals. Across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, SSR yields reliable and consistent improvements over direct solving, in-context learning, and single-source guidance, improving accuracy by up to +13 points on AIME25 and +5 points on Apex for compact reasoning models. Code and benchmark are publicly available at: https://github.com/lwd17/strategy-execute-pipeline.

Recent works on large language models (LLMs) have successfully demonstrated the emergence of reasoning capabilities via reinforcement learning (RL). Although recent efforts leverage group relative policy optimization (GRPO) for MLLMs post-training, they constantly explore one specific aspect, such as grounding tasks, math problems, or chart analysis. There are no works that can leverage multi-source MLLM tasks for stable reinforcement learning. In this work, we present a unified perspective to solve this problem. We present Mixed-R1, a unified yet straightforward framework that contains a mixed reward function design (Mixed-Reward) and a mixed post-training dataset (Mixed-45K). We first design a data engine to select high-quality examples to build the Mixed-45K post-training dataset. Then, we present a Mixed-Reward design, which contains various reward functions for various MLLM tasks. In particular, it has four different reward functions: matching reward for binary answer or multiple-choice problems, chart reward for chart-aware datasets, IoU reward for grounding problems, and open-ended reward for long-form text responses such as caption datasets. To handle the various long-form text content, we propose a new open-ended reward named Bidirectional Max-Average Similarity (BMAS) by leveraging tokenizer embedding matching between the generated response and the ground truth. Extensive experiments show the effectiveness of our proposed method on various MLLMs, including Qwen2.5-VL and Intern-VL on various sizes. Our dataset and model are available at https://github.com/xushilin1/mixed-r1.

Recent breakthroughs in Large Language Models (LLMs) have positioned them as a promising paradigm for agents, with long-term planning and decision-making emerging as core general-purpose capabilities for adapting to diverse scenarios and tasks. Real-time strategy (RTS) games serve as an ideal testbed for evaluating these two capabilities, as their inherent gameplay requires both macro-level strategic planning and micro-level tactical adaptation and action execution. Existing RTS game-based environments either suffer from relatively high computational demands or lack support for textual observations, which has constrained the use of RTS games for LLM evaluation. Motivated by this, we present TowerMind, a novel environment grounded in the tower defense (TD) subgenre of RTS games. TowerMind preserves the key evaluation strengths of RTS games for assessing LLMs, while featuring low computational demands and a multimodal observation space, including pixel-based, textual, and structured game-state representations. In addition, TowerMind supports the evaluation of model hallucination and provides a high degree of customizability. We design five benchmark levels to evaluate several widely used LLMs under different multimodal input settings. The results reveal a clear performance gap between LLMs and human experts across both capability and hallucination dimensions. The experiments further highlight key limitations in LLM behavior, such as inadequate planning validation, a lack of multifinality in decision-making, and inefficient action use. We also evaluate two classic reinforcement learning algorithms: Ape-X DQN and PPO. By offering a lightweight and multimodal design, TowerMind complements the existing RTS game-based environment landscape and introduces a new benchmark for the AI agent field. The source code is publicly available on GitHub(https://github.com/tb6147877/TowerMind).

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

This paper presents a new approach that integrates deep learning with computational chess, using both the Mixture of Experts (MoE) method and Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). Our methodology employs a suite of specialized models, each designed to respond to specific changes in the game's input data. This results in a framework with sparsely activated models, which provides significant computational benefits. Our framework combines the MoE method with MCTS, in order to align it with the strategic phases of chess, thus departing from the conventional ``one-for-all'' model. Instead, we utilize distinct game phase definitions to effectively distribute computational tasks across multiple expert neural networks. Our empirical research shows a substantial improvement in playing strength, surpassing the traditional single-model framework. This validates the efficacy of our integrated approach and highlights the potential of incorporating expert knowledge and strategic principles into neural network design. The fusion of MoE and MCTS offers a promising avenue for advancing machine learning architectures.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has accelerated their application in reasoning, with strategic reasoning drawing increasing attention. To evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning capabilities, game theory, with its concise structure, has become a preferred approach. However, current research focuses on a limited selection of games, resulting in low coverage. Classic game scenarios risk data leakage, and existing benchmarks often lack extensibility, making them inadequate for evaluating state-of-the-art models. To address these challenges, we propose TMGBench, a benchmark with comprehensive game type coverage, novel scenarios, and flexible organization. Specifically, we incorporate all 144 game types summarized by the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games, constructed as classic games. We also employ synthetic data generation to create diverse, higher-quality scenarios through topic guidance and human inspection, referred to as story-based games. Lastly, we provide a sustainable framework for increasingly powerful LLMs by treating these games as atomic units and organizing them into more complex forms via sequential, parallel, and nested structures. Our comprehensive evaluation of mainstream LLMs covers tests on rational reasoning, robustness, Theory-of-Mind (ToM), and reasoning in complex forms. Results reveal flaws in accuracy, consistency, and varying mastery of ToM. Additionally, o1-mini, OpenAI's latest reasoning model, achieved accuracy rates of 66.6%, 60.0%, and 70.0% on sequential, parallel, and nested games, highlighting TMGBench's challenges.

This paper addresses the fundamental problem of non-uniform area coverage in multi-agent systems, where different regions require varying levels of attention due to mission-dependent priorities. Existing uniform coverage strategies are insufficient for realistic applications, and many non-uniform approaches either lack optimality guarantees or fail to incorporate crucial real-world constraints such as agent dynamics, limited operation time, the number of agents, and decentralized execution. To resolve these limitations, we propose a novel framework called Density-Driven Optimal Control (D2OC). The central idea of D2OC is the integration of optimal transport theory with multi-agent coverage control, enabling each agent to continuously adjust its trajectory to match a mission-specific reference density map. The proposed formulation establishes optimality by solving a constrained optimization problem that explicitly incorporates physical and operational constraints. The resulting control input is analytically derived from the Lagrangian of the objective function, yielding closed-form optimal solutions for linear systems and a generalizable structure for nonlinear systems. Furthermore, a decentralized data-sharing mechanism is developed to coordinate agents without reliance on global information. Comprehensive simulation studies demonstrate that D2OC achieves significantly improved non-uniform area coverage performance compared to existing methods, while maintaining scalability and decentralized implementability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to simulate human-like decision making in agent-based financial market models (ABMs). As models become more powerful and accessible, researchers can now incorporate individual LLM decisions into ABM environments. However, integration may introduce inherent biases that need careful evaluation. In this paper we test three state-of-the-art GPT models for bias using two model sampling approaches: one-shot and few-shot API queries. We observe significant variations in distributions of outputs between specific models, and model sub versions, with GPT-4o-Mini-2024-07-18 showing notably better performance (32-43% yes responses) compared to GPT-4-0125-preview's extreme bias (98-99% yes responses). We show that sampling methods and model sub-versions significantly impact results: repeated independent API calls produce different distributions compared to batch sampling within a single call. While no current GPT model can simultaneously achieve a uniform distribution and Markovian properties in one-shot testing, few-shot sampling can approach uniform distributions under certain conditions. We explore the Temperature parameter, providing a definition and comparative results. We further compare our results to true random binary series and test specifically for the common human bias of Negative Recency - finding LLMs have a mixed ability to 'beat' humans in this one regard. These findings emphasise the critical importance of careful LLM integration into ABMs for financial markets and more broadly.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

We propose Monte Carlo Permutation Search (MCPS), a general-purpose Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm that improves upon the GRAVE algorithm. MCPS is relevant when deep reinforcement learning is not an option, or when the computing power available before play is not substantial, such as in General Game Playing, for example. The principle of MCPS is to include in the exploration term of a node the statistics on all the playouts that contain all the moves on the path from the root to the node. We extensively test MCPS on a variety of games: board games, wargame, investment game, video game and multi-player games. MCPS has better results than GRAVE in all the two-player games. It has equivalent results for multi-player games because these games are inherently balanced even when players have different strengths. We also show that using abstract codes for moves instead of exact codes can be beneficial to both MCPS and GRAVE, as they improve the permutation statistics and the AMAF statistics. We also provide a mathematical derivation of the formulas used for weighting the three sources of statistics. These formulas are an improvement on the GRAVE formula since they no longer use the bias hyperparameter of GRAVE. Moreover, MCPS is not sensitive to the ref hyperparameter.

Recent advances in LLMs have enabled their use as autonomous agents across a range of tasks, yet they continue to struggle with formulating and adhering to coherent long-term strategies. In this paper, we investigate whether LLM agents can self-improve when placed in environments that explicitly challenge their strategic planning abilities. Using the board game Settlers of Catan, accessed through the open-source Catanatron framework, we benchmark a progression of LLM-based agents, from a simple game-playing agent to systems capable of autonomously rewriting their own prompts and their player agent's code. We introduce a multi-agent architecture in which specialized roles (Analyzer, Researcher, Coder, and Player) collaborate to iteratively analyze gameplay, research new strategies, and modify the agent's logic or prompt. By comparing manually crafted agents to those evolved entirely by LLMs, we evaluate how effectively these systems can diagnose failure and adapt over time. Our results show that self-evolving agents, particularly when powered by models like Claude 3.7 and GPT-4o, outperform static baselines by autonomously adopting their strategies, passing along sample behavior to game-playing agents, and demonstrating adaptive reasoning over multiple iterations.